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ABSTRACT
The findings of this study suggest that while the FRR score provides a reasonable indication of
financial fragility over a subsequent five-year period, the FRR score is little better than a coin
flip in predicting whether a religiously affiliated higher education institution will be financially
troubled enough to close within the subsequent five years. The study found that using a multifactor model to predict closure results in higher predictive accuracy during the observed period.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Introduction
In October 2019, when Cincinnati Christian University (CCU) announced it would close
at the end of the Fall 2019 semester, marking the end of the faith-based institution’s 95-year
history, it came as a shock to some students, disappointment to many, and disrupted the athletic
and academic careers of about 350 students (DiTirro, 2019). While the decision to close before
the end of the academic year came as a surprise to many, the Chronicle of Higher
Education reported on CCU’s financial strain on July 19, 2019 – noting that decisions to invest
in athletic programs while cutting costs, staff, and faculty and simultaneously adjusting the
mission of the school were “among the many that have pushed Cincinnati Christian toward the
brink of financial ruin and put it at risk of losing its accreditation” (Kelderman & Bauman,
2019).
Unfortunately, the story of Cincinnati Christian is a familiar one to thousands of students,
faculty, and staff at private, faith-based institutions nationwide. In the years leading up to the
pandemic-induced crisis, financial pressures on institutions and families were nothing new. Since
2016, more than 50 private, not-for-profit institutions have announced their closure or
consolidation due to financial failure (Busta, 2020). The worldwide COVID-19 pandemic in
2020 served to exacerbate the financial strain on the budgets of thousands of colleges and
universities and millions of families responsible for paying the tuition, room, and board for the
students enrolled at those institutions.
To assess the financial strength and stability of institutions receiving federal student loans
or grants, the United States Department of Education utilizes a measure known as the Financial
Responsibility Ratio (FRR). The FRR is a composite of three ratios calculated utilizing the
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institution’s audited financial statements. The three ratios measure cash reserves, unencumbered
assets, and net income. The composite score reflects institutions’ overall relative financial health
along a scale from negative 1.0 to positive 3.0. A score greater than or equal to 1.5 indicates that
the institution is considered financially responsible. Schools with scores of less than 1.5 but
greater than or equal to 1.0 are considered financially responsible but require additional
monitoring. Schools with a score less than 1.0 are considered not financially responsible (Federal
Student Aid, 2020a).
The FRR is a retrospective measure of financial performance. However, governing
boards and administrators need to have predictive risk measures at their disposal to effectively
manage the risk of closure and avoid taking unnecessary risks when attempting to manage an
institution struggling with maintaining viability. Other factors, such as local area demographics,
enrollment levels, endowment levels, graduation rates, and staffing levels, which extend beyond
the operational, financial data measured by the FRR and traditional financially focused metrics,
are some of the root causes of these failures.
With increased financial pressures placed on institutions because of the 2020 pandemic,
stakeholders will need practical tools to assess institutional stability and viability. This study
explores multiple risk factors faced by private, religiously affiliated higher education institutions
issuing undergraduate degrees and provides governing boards, administrators, accrediting bodies,
and regulators with the common financial and demographic factors which appeared to have a
significant predictive value of failure among those institutions that closed from 2016 to 2020.
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Background
As measured on June 1, 2016, there were 184 not-for-profit colleges and universities
subjected to Heightened Cash Monitoring (HCM) by the United States Department of Education
(“Department”). Of these 184 institutions, 91 were subjected to HCM because they showed an
FRR score below 1.5 as the sole reason for inclusion in HCM (Federal Student Aid, 2020b), a
calculation known as the Financial Responsibility Ratio (FRR). Other reasons for inclusion in
HCM protocols were late or missing audits and financial statements (72), administrative
capability (6), severe findings in reviewing the financial aid program (5), accreditation problems
(2), payment method changes (1), eligibility problems (1), severe audit problems (1), and
provisional certification (1). Of the institutions on HCM on June 1, 2016, 43 were not-for-profit
religiously affiliated institutions that offered undergraduate degrees in the 2017 academic year.
Appendix A provides a list of those institutions.
Section 498(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, requires for-profit and
non-profit institutions to annually submit audited financial statements to the Department to
demonstrate they are maintaining the standards of financial responsibility necessary to
participate in the Title IV student loan and grant programs administered by the Department. One
of many standards, which the Department utilizes to gauge an institution’s financial
responsibility, is a composite of three ratios derived from an institution’s audited financial
statements. The three ratios are a primary reserve ratio, an equity ratio, and a net income ratio.
These ratios gauge the fundamental elements of the financial health of an institution, not the
educational quality of an institution.
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The simplicity of calculating the FRR score, coupled with its use by state and federal
governments in assessing financial stability and eligibility for participation in many students aid
and research grant programs, makes the score a popular measure. The calculation and results are
public data utilized by governing boards and state legislatures as part of their respective
oversight roles. However, the FRR does not provide a holistic assessment of an institution’s
health. The FRR has many critics who note that it is backward-looking, disregards changes to
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, and the interventions required to meet Department of
Education mandates may exacerbate the school’s financial challenges rather than protect the
stakeholders (Sokol & Cao, 2019). In analyzing the data, of the 50 institutions that closed
between 2016 and 2020, 21 of them had healthy FRR scores in FY 2016. Conversely, of the 140
institutions receiving a failing FRR score in 2016, 119 institutions were still operating in 2020
(Busta, 2020; Federal Student Aid, 2020a).
Complicating matters for governing boards and administrators faced with a weak FRR
score, demographic shifts make it more challenging for less selective colleges and universities to
compete for enrollment and maintain financial stability, mainly if they are heavily reliant on
tuition to meet operating funding requirements (Eide, 2018). Based on the 2016 – 2020 FRR and
closure data, local and regional demographic shifts, tuition discounting, enrollment trends, and
admissions selectivity may provide a far more accurate prediction of institutional viability.
However, these factors are rarely reported or analyzed in predicting institutional distress.
Recognizing the increasing challenges faced by religiously affiliated institutions,
Andringa (2009) noted that of the nine hundred religiously affiliated schools identified; many
were “fragile or on the brink” of failure (p.168). As President of the Council for Christian
Colleges and Universities (CCCU), Andringa (2009) surveyed one hundred CCCU member
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institutions and reviewed the most fragile members of the organization to identify common traits
among the weakest institutions. Fifty-four institutions responded. The results noted five key
indicators, noted in Table 1 below, were frequently identified in the most fragile institutions.
Table 1
Five Most Relevant Indicators of Financial Fragility in Order of Occurrence
_________________________________________________________________
1. The institution is on probation, warning, or financial watch with the regional
accreditor or a specialty degree licensor.
2. Short-term bridge financing was required in the final quarter of the last five fiscal
years.
3. Deferred maintenance is at least 40 percent unfunded.
4. A majority of the faculty do not hold terminal degrees.
5. Debt service is more than 10 percent of the operating budget.
_______________________________________________________________
Adapted from “Keeping the faith: leadership challenges unique to religiously affiliated colleges and universities”
by R.C. Andringa, 2009, in Turnaround: leading stressed colleges and universities to excellence. J. Martin & J.E.
Samels (Eds.), p. 175. Copyright 2013 by Johns Hopkins University Press.

Of the five elements noted by Andringa (2009), only the fifth element, the level of debt
service, is a component of the FRR calculation. The four more relevant indicators are not
measured by the FRR, although the placement on probation may be, in part, the result of a poor
FRR score.
Andringa (2009) took the survey results one step further and looked to identify the root
causes of financial fragility identified in the organizational membership. Table 2 summarizes the
causes presented by Andringa. While many of the causes are institutional, such as relations with
sponsoring congregations or religious requirements of the sponsoring congregations, Andringa
(2009) noted that the number one cause of institutional fragility was “location, location,
5

location” (p. 171). Noting that many of today’s current students would rather eschew the
generally rural and pastoral settings of small religiously affiliated institutions for larger
institutions in urban settings, this trend, coupled with a tuition-dependent financial structure, is a
significant negative factor for these institutions.
Table 2
Seven Major Causes of Fragility Among Religiously Affiliated Institutions
________________________________________________________________
1. Location
2. “The burden of the liberal arts.”
3. Church relations
4. Church-Campus governance conflicts
5. Institutional independence and political decision making
6. Cost of residence life
7. Faith and accountability
______________________________________________________________
Adapted from “Keeping the faith: leadership challenges unique to religiously affiliated colleges and universities”
by R.C. Andringa, 2009, in Turnaround: leading stressed colleges and universities to excellence. J. Martin & J.E.
Samels (Eds.), p. 171-174. Copyright 2013 by Johns Hopkins University Press.

In a 2012 Report of the NAICU Financial Responsibility Task Force, the National
Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU) examined the FRR score
considering the failure of over 100 private colleges and universities. The report notes six
recommendations for improving the use of the FRR to evaluate higher education institutions'
financial condition. Table 3 below summarizes these recommendations. The report identified
seven inconsistencies between Department of Education accounting definitions and Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (p.18), which, at best, distort the institution's financial
6

position and may create confusion or miscalculation on the part of the institutions reporting the
data.
Table 3
NAICU Recommendations for Improving the Use of the FRR Score
___________________________________________________________________
1. Ensure that the Department of Education follows its regulations and uses standard
accounting definitions when applying the FRR.
2. The Department of Education should either not treat endowment losses as expenses
for FRR calculations or expand the primary reserve ratio to include all net assets in
the calculation.
3.

The current regulations allow institutions to demonstrate financial responsibility with
alternative methods as provided in the statute, and these need to be retained for
institutional flexibility.

4. The Department of Education needs to develop a consistent appeals process as part of
the FRR reporting process to allow for amendment and correction.
5. The Secretary of Education should “fully implement” (National Association of
Independent Colleges and Universities, 2012, p.7) the requirement to thoroughly
examine the “total financial circumstances” of institutions that fail ratios stated in the
Higher Education Act of 1965, Section 498(c)(3)(C) and not just apply a bright-line
test in assessing penalties and corrective measures.
6. The Department of Education needs to establish an advisory panel of objective expert
practitioners of not-for-profit accounting to provide technical guidance.
______________________________________________________________________
Adapted from Report of the NAICU Financial Responsibility Task Force p. 5-17 by Copyright 2012 by the
National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities.
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In 2019, the Department of Education made changes in the regulations designed to
protect student borrowers and assess the financial health and stability of institutions receiving
Federal Title IV loan funds in response to the failure of Corinthian Colleges. Subsequently, the
Department of Education identified shortcomings in the FRR measurement when examining
borrowers’ defenses to repay student loans. The Department of Education (Student Assistance
General Provisions, 2019) identified five automatic triggers that would cause a recalculation of
the FRR and eight discretionary triggers to recalculate the FRR and assess the institutional total
financial circumstances as required by the Higher Education Act of 1965, Section 498(c)(3)(C).
Table 4 provides a summary of these triggers.
Table 4
Department of Education FRR Recalculation Triggers
____________________________________________________________________
Required Triggers
1. Debts arising from a judicial or administrative proceeding or settlement.
2. Borrower defense-related lawsuits.
3. Other litigation with significant loss potential.
4. Accrediting agency actions requiring a teach-out plan when closing a branch or
additional location.
5. Gainful employment programs that could become ineligible for federal aid in the
following award year.
Discretionary Triggers
1. Significant fluctuations year-to-year in the amount of Pell Grant and Direct Loan
funds received by the institution.
8

2. Citation by state licensing or authorizing agency for failing requirements.
3. Failing a financial stress test devised or adopted by the Department of Education.
4. High annual dropout rates.
5. Accreditation status on probation, show-cause order, or similar action.
6. Violation of a provision of a requirement in a loan agreement that allows the creditor
to increase collateral.
7. Pending claims of borrower relief discharge.
8. Significant borrower defense claims are expected due to lawsuit, settlement,
judgment, or findings.
______________________________________________________________________
Adapted from Student Assistance General Provisions 84 Fed. Reg. p. 49788-49933. Published September 23,
2019.

The 2019 addition of enumerated mandatory and discretionary triggers, which include
non-financial measures, provides indicia that the Department of Education recognizes the
limitation of the FRR on assessing the sustainability of the financial institution. First proposed in
2016 and revised with the August 30, 2019, promulgation and effective date of July 1, 2020,
these regulations represent a broadening of the assessment of institutions and a movement away
from the use of the FRR as a sole bright-line test - which consists of a clearly defined objective
standard and measurement, leaving little open to interpretation by the user – and a movement
towards a more holistic assessment of the institutional health by the Department of Education.
While there is an emerging consensus that the FRR is inadequate as a sole measure of
institutional stability, the search for more effective predictors has continued to focus primarily on
measures internal to the institution. As shown with the studies noted above, the research
literature analyzes the financial measures of the institution. While a literature review finds the
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common threads of budgetary control, ratio analysis and endowment, and enrollment levels, few
integrate the demographic and external factors that potentially impact the institution's
sustainability.
Statement of the Problem
Governing boards and other stakeholders often focus on bright-line measures of objective
factors and easy-to-understand key performance indicators (KPIs) to trigger significant changes
in leadership and strategy. These factors and KPIs are easy to evaluate and tend to produce
certainty in the user’s evaluation of whether the institution achieved the desired level of
performance. However, this simple approach may not lead to balanced or equitable decisions—
the most-reported metric, the FRR, may be a poor predictor of institutional failure. Decisions
made utilizing the FRR as the primary predictor of institutional distress may provide false or
delayed financial stability or instability signals and ultimately result in poor decision-making.
Much of the research and approaches to analysis rely on financial measures, which tend to be
lagging. Additionally, while financial failure is the last and most apparent step in the road to
institutional failure, other factors were the root cause of the institution’s financial performance.
New measurements and metrics are required to better predict institutional distress at faith-based
institutions and allow stakeholders to manage those factors that will most impact the institution’s
future.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this quantitative study is to examine financial and demographic factors
which may predict institutional failure for faith-based, not-for-profit higher education
institutions. This study aims to provide insights into critical influences on institutional financial
performance for use by governing boards, administrators, and regulatory agencies.
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The nature of the study requires the use of statistical analysis over an extended period.
This study provides stakeholders with additional information on how heavily to weigh and best
manage these factors when determining the financial stability of an organization, developing
strategies for institutional success, and assessing the likelihood of institutional failure.
Research Questions
To understand how data may be utilized as a trigger to change leadership and strategy,
the study asked two research questions:
1. What factors predict institutional health for private, faith-based non-profit higher
education institutions as determined by the institution’s inclusion on the Department of
Education’s Heightened Cash Monitoring list in the 2018-2019 Academic Year as
measured by a reported FRR Score below 1.5 for the 2018-2019 Academic Year?
2. What factors can be used to predict institutional closure for private, faith-based non-profit
higher education institutions?
Significance of the Study
The findings of this study will benefit policymakers, institutional governing boards, and
university administrators in determining the financial health of educational institutions and
developing operational, financial, and leadership strategies. Increased financial stressors
resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact of volatility in financial markets on
institutional endowments will heighten scrutiny on institutional financial stability and
performance. To facilitate strategy development and tactical decisions, stakeholders increasingly
rely on KPIs and other data points to summarize vast financial and operational information.
Understanding critical variables of financial stability utilizing the data from the institutions that
predicted institutional financial distress or failure during the 2014-2019 timeframe will provide
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key stakeholders with the information needed to assess whether the institution appears to have a
path to viability, which elements are most impactful, and to establish a strategy for institutional
assessment and recovery.
Limitations of the Study
The analysis does not include the perspectives of governing boards or other leadership
stakeholders to determine what weighting they give the FRR score or other factors in the
decision-making process. The data comprise five years from 2013-2014 through 2018-2019. This
period saw a recovery from unprecedented financial disruption and worldwide recession ending
in 2010. It was in the middle of a nearly ten-year economic expansionary period, as well as a
period of significant regulatory change impacting private, for-profit institutions.
The population sets of HCM (Appendix A) and closed (Appendix C) institutions
represent the entire population of faith-based, not-for-profit private institutions falling within
those parameters for the period analyzed. This limits the potential applicability of the data, and
the findings are not generalizable. The control group of 100 institutions (Appendix B) used in the
study represents 17% of the approximately 593 faith-based, not-for-profit private institutions not
on HCM in 2016.
The study is limited in applicability to public-funded institutions as well. Public
institutions have potential recourse to state funding and donors, bonding, and other sources of
fundraising, which may make the data incompatible with private institutions.
Another limitation is that the data were not collected for the purpose for which it was
used. Additionally, because of the focus on the FRR score, institutions may have failed to
accurately report their financial statements or their FRR score to the Department of Education.
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The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) information on other variables
may be inaccurate.
Finally, the study utilized an ex post facto non-experimental design. This type of study
limits manipulating the variables within a controlled setting to further test and validate predictive
power (Ex post facto study, 2012).
Definition of Terms
While the study initially analyzed 139 variables, only 13 were selected based on
statistical differences in the means that help answer the research questions. The definitions of the
key terms are as follows:
Core Expenses: Core expenses for Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
(primarily private, not-for-profit, and for-profit) institutions include instruction, research, public
service, academic support, student services, institutional support, net grant aid to students and
other expenses. For FASB institutions, core expenses exclude auxiliary enterprises (e.g.,
bookstores, dormitories), hospitals, and independent operations (National Center for Education
Statistics, 2020a).
Core Revenues: Core revenues for private, not-for-profit, and public institutions reporting
under the FASB standards include tuition and fees; government appropriations (federal, state,
and local); government grants and contracts; private gifts, grants, and contracts; investment
return; sales and services of educational activities; and other sources. In general, core revenues
exclude auxiliary enterprises (e.g., bookstores, dormitories), hospitals, and independent
operations (National Center for Education Statistics, 2020a).
Distance Education: The number of students completing one or more classes by distance
education enrolled in the Fall semester (National Center for Education Statistics, 2020a).
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Endowment funds: Funds whose principal is nonexpendable (true endowment) and
intended to be invested to provide earnings for institutional use. It also includes term
endowments and funds functioning as endowments (National Center for Education Statistics,
2020a).
Financial aid: Federal Work-Study, grants, loans to students (government and private),
assistantships, scholarships, fellowships, tuition waivers, tuition discounts, employer aid (tuition
reimbursement), and other monies (other than from relatives/friends) provided to students to
meet expenses. This excludes loans to parents (National Center for Education Statistics, 2020a).
Financially fragile: An institution with an FRR score below 1.5. (Federal Student Aid,
2020a).
Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Staff: The full-time-equivalent (FTE) of staff is calculated
by summing the total number of full-time staff from the Employees by Assigned Position (EAP)
component and adding one-third of the total number of part-time staff.
Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Students: The number of FTE students is calculated based
on fall student headcounts reported by the institution on the IPEDS Enrollment. The FTE of the
institution's part-time enrollment is estimated by multiplying the factors noted below times the
part-time headcount. These are then added to the full-time enrollment headcounts to obtain an
FTE for all students enrolled in the fall (National Center for Education Statistics, 2020a).
Graduation rate: The rate required for disclosure and reporting purposes under the
Student Right-to-Know Act. This rate is calculated as the total number of completers within
150% of standard time divided by the revised adjusted cohort (National Center for Education
Statistics, 2020a).
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Part-Time Enrollment: Undergraduate: A student enrolled for either less than 12 semester
or quarter credits or less than 24 contact hours a week each term. Graduate: A student enrolled
for less than nine semester or quarter credits (National Center for Education Statistics, 2020a).
Pell Grant: (Higher Education Act of 1965, Title IV, Part A, Subpart I, as amended.)
Provides grant assistance to eligible undergraduate postsecondary students with demonstrated
financial need to help meet education expenses (National Center for Education Statistics, 2020a).
Retention rate: A measure of the rate students persists in their educational program at an
institution, expressed as a percentage. For four-year institutions, this is the percentage of firsttime bachelor (or equivalent) degree-seeking undergraduates from the previous fall who are
again enrolled in the current fall. For all other institutions, this is the percentage of first-time
degree/certificate-seeking students from the previous fall who either re-enrolled or completed
their program by the current fall (National Center for Education Statistics, 2020a).
Tuition and fees: The amount of tuition and required fees covering a full academic year
most frequently charged to students. These values represent what a typical student would be
charged and may not be the same for all students at an institution. If tuition is charged on a percredit-hour basis, the average full-time credit hour load for an entire academic year is used to
estimate average tuition. Required fees include all fixed sum charges required of such a large
proportion of all students that the student who does not pay the charges is an exception (National
Center for Education Statistics, 2020a).
Tuition discount rate: Institutional support divided by tuition (National Center for
Education Statistics, 2020a).
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Methods
The study first reviewed the performance of three cohorts of faith-based institutions from
the 2013-2014 to the 2018-19 academic year across 139 financial and demographic variables to
assess which variables were likely to have a statistically significant impact on the institution's
viability. The study utilized descriptive statistics to compare the cohort of 43 institutions noted in
Appendix A on HCM in June 2016 with a cohort of 100 randomly selected faith-based, not-forprofit higher education institutions that were not on HCM in June 2016, as listed in Appendix B.
The study compared their financial performance and the underlying demographic trends at the
institutions from the 2013-2014 academic year to the 2018-2019 academic year and identified
common trends or indicators that provided leading indicators of financial distress that may be
more useful than the FRR score. Additionally, 11 institutions announced they would close or did
close during the 2019 and 2020 academic years. These 11 institutions are listed in Appendix C
and include four from Appendix A.
The study then identified the 13 factors that showed a high probability for statistical
significance based on an analysis of their descriptive statistics and a pairwise t-test across the
three cohorts. These factors were logistically regressed for the three cohorts to determine the
probability that they could accurately predict whether an institution would be either financially
fragile or closed during the 2019-2020 academic year. The study compared these results to a
logistic regression where the FRR score was the sole variable for determining the probability of
either financial fragility or closure.
The study compiled the analyzed data using FRR and HCM information available from
the United States Department of Education and the National Center for Education Statistics
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) on institutional enrollment data,
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student demographic data, tuition data, financial data categorized by Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles classification, endowment level, admissions rate, and tuition discount rate.
The study recorded the self-stated denomination affiliation for each institution. Finally, the study
analyzed the United States Census Bureau's localized population and economic data.
The study examined trends in the data beginning with the 2013-2014 academic year
through the 2018-2019 academic year by cohort based on both absolute level and the percentage
change from the base year of 2013-14.
The study calculated descriptive statistics on each population. The study then utilized a
two-sample t-test test to determine the difference between the means and standard deviations of
the variables. This step was utilized to determine which categorical variables differed between
the closed and control populations to identify the probable significant factors.
Multivariate logistic regression analysis was then used to calculate a probability in
predicting institutional fragility and closure for the institutions. The results were compared to
logistic regression for the same factors utilizing only FRR as the independent variable. The
probabilities were then compared, and the results analyzed.
Summary
Religiously affiliated higher education institutions comprise approximately 16% of the
degree-granting institutions in the United States (National Center for Education Statistics, 2020b)
but represent over 23% of the institutions on HCM in June 2016. The fragility of these
institutions relative to the general population of higher education institutions creates a challenge
for the administrators, governing boards, and regulators charged with the operation and oversight
of these institutions to provide a stable educational environment. Understanding the drivers of
financial distress before they become a crisis will allow for more proactive management and
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mitigation of these drivers. By analyzing cohorts of fragile and stable institutions across a set of
key data points, this study will help identify those drivers that appear to have significant impacts
on institutional stability and provide those insights into institutional stakeholders to assist with
management, oversight, and decision making.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review intends to summarize the critical research, works, and findings in
using key performance indicators in assessing the health of higher education institutions
generally and not-for-profit private religious higher education institutions specifically.
Much of the literature is based on information that is decades old, and the data relied on
by the authors predates the most recent wave of closures. Some of the literature must be analyzed
intuitively, as the focus of many studies was on turnaround strategies rather than institutions that
ultimately failed.
Leslie and Fretwell (1997) developed a four-factor analytical model consisting of
institutional financial condition trends, external factors, stability and openness in management,
and vitality of education programs. They determined that monitoring these four factors and their
interaction would predict future financial distress. The Leslie and Fretwell study is now 25 years
old, and higher education and demographics have changed considerably over that time, and a
comprehensive update is necessary.
The study organizes Chapter 2 by section based on the following criteria. The first
section presents a brief history of the development of the FRR score and the legislation leading
to its use as the primary measure by the Department of Education to assess institutional financial
viability. The second section reviews quantitative studies and research on the viability of higher
education institutions, focusing on the measures and inputs that appear to predict closure. The
third section reviews qualitative research exploring these same factors. The goal is to understand
the existing relevant research and how it may predict the closure of faith-based higher education
institutions.
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A Brief History of the FRR Composite Score
Increased focus on using ratio analysis and key performance indicator (KPI)
measurements to assess higher education institutions' financial viability began in the early 1970s
with three converging influences. The first was the 1973 publication of the Industry Audit Guide:
Audits of Colleges and Universities by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
The second was a report by the National Commission on the Financing of Postsecondary
Education the same year, which recommended the development of KPIs for higher education
institutions as part of an expanding college and university enrollment in the wake of the Vietnam
War. Finally, in 1974, the National Association of College and University Business Officers
(NACUBO) published College and University Business Administration, which developed GAAP
and classifications for higher education institutions. These three elements created the framework
for developing the first sets of commonly used financial ratios by the accounting firm of Peat
Marwick (Curry, 1998).
Development of additional financial models continued during the 1970s and 1980s in
response to increasing institutional borrowing and enrollment trends. Dickmeyer (1980)
published a technical report on KPIs and other indicators to assess the financial health of
universities in 1980. The Dickmeyer study focused on environmental and internal financial
factors and identified that multiple revenue streams, limited competition, low tuition, and high
institutional demand combine to create a sustainable higher education business model. In
contrast, operational inefficiencies and suboptimal market segments could combine to undermine
institutional financial stability (Dickmeyer, 1980, p.5-6). The study identified five indicators to
monitor to assess the financial health of a higher education institution, shown below in Table 5:
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Table 5
Dickmeyer’s Five Indicators of Financial Health
___________________________________________________________________
1. The changes in the potential for institutional distress are measured by the ability to
manage during economic downturns and add academic programs to meet changing
market needs.
2. Changes in institutional financial resources.
3. Changes in academic emphasis.
4. Changes in the extent of academic opportunity.
5. Increased need for additional financial resources.
______________________________________________________________________
Adapted from “Concepts Related to Indicators of College and University Financial Health” by N. Dickmeyer,
1980, Technical Report No. 12 American Institutes for Research in the Behavioral Sciences. p.17. Copyright 1980
by National Center for Education Statistics.

These represent some of the foundational studies on the development of KPI reporting
and the increasing influence ratio analysis and KPI management had on assessing institutional
financial strength. Additional studies continued this trajectory over the next twenty years.
Based on a number of these studies, the National Association for College and University
Business Officers (NACUBO) published Financial Self-Assessment: A Workbook for Colleges
2nd edition in 1987. The revisions in this edition from the first edition of the work published in
1981 further expanded on Dickmeyer’s 1980 study and developed institutional factors including
financial resource measures, instructional expenditures, staffing levels, staffing level changes,
flexibility, and selectivity in accepting students. The workbook identified these elements as
critical influences on the financial risk borne by the institution.
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NACUBO continued gathering information and conducted a two-year benchmarking
project of KPIs and major financial trends – gathering data from nearly 150 participating
institutions. This project resulted in a 1992 release of a national database of KPIs and
benchmarks for 38 functional areas in the higher education institution, including admissions,
academic affairs, staffing levels, facilities, and endowment management. While the study did not
provide prescriptive solutions for those institutions falling outside the benchmark ranges, it did
provide effective benchmarks to guide administrators and other stakeholders with indicia of
under- or over-performance in these key functional areas (Kempner & Shafer, 1993).
On September 20, 1996, the Department of Education published proposed rulemaking that
would create a requirement for all financial institutions receiving Title IV aid to submit audited
financial statements to help ensure that there was no defalcation of federal aid and that the
institutions were maintaining adequate controls and appropriate financial resources. The
Department of Education had engaged KPMG, the successor firm to Peat Marwick – who
initiated the development of the initial financial ratio studies in the 1970s as noted in Curry
(1998) – to develop an approach that could utilize existing measures of institutional performance
to evaluate the financial stability of institutions receiving Title IV aid (Student Assistance
General Provisions, 1997a).
The final rules promulgated on November 25, 1997 (Student Assistance General
Provisions, 1997b) established the methodology for calculating the FRR. The model developed
by KPMG and adopted by the Department of Education normalized responses from the financial
statements utilizing three ratios: the primary reserve ratio, the equity ratio, and the net income
ratio. The calculation of the FRR must tie back to the audited financial statements prepared by
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the auditor of the institution’s choice. The three base ratios developed by the Department of
Education were:
1. Primary Reserve Ratio – calculated by dividing the expendable net assets by total
expenses.
2. Equity Ratio – calculated by dividing modified net assets as defined by the modified
assets as defined.
3. Net Income Ratio – calculated by dividing the change in unrestricted net assets by
total unrestricted revenues.

Following the period covered in this study, in 2020, the Department of Education
promulgated changes in calculating the FRR score. This was driven, in part, as a reaction to the
global pandemic caused by COVID-19. Under the new regulation, the mitigation requirements
for institutions on Heightened Cash Monitoring are reduced. The calculations consider changes
in GAAP relating to gains, losses, endowment, debt, and pension obligations. For most
institutions, these changes will have little impact on their calculations (Towne & Ostapenko,
2020).
The literature is best analyzed in terms of quantitative studies, which explore the
relationship of institutional stability to variables within a quantitative framework, and qualitative
studies, which explore the impacts of leadership and non-quantitative factors on institutional
stability. These two groups organize the literature review, and within them, by recency.
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Quantitative Based Studies
In 2001, Wanczyk conducted a quantitative examination of various factors to predict an
institution’s short- and long-term viability within a case study environment at a flagship public
institution. The Wanczyk study built on the 1996 study by Leslie and Fretwell and attempted to
apply the four-factor model to a real-life situation. The case study noted that the Leslie and
Fretwell model worked well to identify high-level trends and evaluate alternative financial and
operational policies. The study noted that the model was limited in predicting future revenue
streams and enrollment trends, the time and difficulties to implement corrective action, and the
very high analysis level, limiting the ability to develop specific budgetary or policy prescriptions.
As it pertains to this study, the Wanczyk study was focused on a flagship public university, not a
private institution. The ability to gather and analyze data at institutions with the level of
resources at a flagship institution is greater, but making rapid change is likely significantly
lower. However, the four-factor model, including external factors, appears to have predictive
value. As shown in the literature review, these external factors are often excluded from similar
studies and warrant examination as part of this study.
Trussel, Greenlee, and Brady (2002) developed a “Financial Vulnerability Index” (FVI)
designed to measure institutional financial distress. The FVI was used by Certified Public
Accountants and other financial stakeholders when assessing issues such as the probability of an
institution continuing as a going concern. The authors noted that the methods used in the forprofit sector for assessing financial viability do not necessarily translate well to the not-for-profit
sector. The five-step model looks at the debt ratio, revenue concentration, surplus margin,
administrative cost ratio, and institutional size to arrive at an index score. That score is then
compared to benchmarks, and the FVI is determined to be strong, vulnerable, or inconclusive.
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The authors note that “Other financial and nonfinancial information should also be considered
when evaluating an organization” (Trussel et al, 2002, p.3). However, these nonfinancial
measures are not provided, and the approach is focused on a use case that is designed to provide,
in the case of a going concern opinion, a twelve-to-twenty-four-month time horizon.
Sturm (2005) identified eight key variables that indicated financial distress (Table 6). Of
the eight variables identified in the study as being significant predictors, three of the eight were
unrelated to the instruction of students. Instead, they were based on a diversification of revenue
streams: giving, grants, and auxiliary enterprises. The most significant variables were the balance
of the cost of instruction, total costs, and current revenues and expenditures. The bottom line is
that higher education institutions fail because their financial resources degrade, their productivity
declines, and enrollment decreases. Since the publication of the Sturm study over fifteen years
ago, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles have dramatically changed for private
institutions, and fund accounting is no longer used. Additionally, changes in online and graduate
programs following the 2008-2009 financial crisis may limit the current applicability.
Table 6
Sturm’s Eight Key Variables
_________________________________________________________________
1. Ratio of Freshmen FTE to Undergraduate FTE
2. Ratio of Current Fund Expenditure Transfers to Revenues
3. Ratio of Instructional Expenditures to Total Current Fund Expenditures
4. Ratio of Gifts, Grants, and Contract Revenues to Total Current Funds Revenues
5. Ratio of Auxiliary Enterprises Revenues to Auxiliary Enterprises Expenditures
6. Ratio of Student Services Expenditures to Total Current Fund Expenditure Transfers
7. Ratio of Research Expenditures to Total Current Fund Expenditure Transfers
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8. Ratio of Other Income Revenues to Total Current Fund Revenues
______________________________________________________________________
Adapted from Knowing When A Higher Education Institution is in Trouble, by P.S. Sturm. 2005. p. 116-117.
Marshall University Doctoral Dissertation. Copyright 2005 by P.S. Sturm.

Among the books written about turning around higher education in distress, Martin and
Samels (2013) analyzed the critical at-risk indicators for assessing institutional stress as part of a
broader look at the experiences of two hundred leaders facing institutional distress and tasked
with turning around higher educational institutions. While the book was focused on providing
leaders with advice on identifying and shoring up institutional weaknesses leveraging the
experience of other leaders, their study also identified twenty at-risk indicators for institutions,
comprising both qualitative and quantitative factors (Table 7). Martin and Samels assessed the
risk factors to understand root causes of distress and assist college leaders in developing
strategies to mitigate or correct these root causes. However, their analysis is now over ten years
old and did not account for externalities like local economic or demographic trends.
Table 7
Martin and Samels Risk Indicators
__________________________________________________________________
1. Tuition discount is more than 35%.
2. Tuition dependency is more than 85%.
3. Debt service is more than 10% of the annual operating budget.
4. There is less than a 1 to 3 ratio between the endowment and the operating budget.
5. Student default rate is above 5%.
6. Average tuition increase is greater than 8% for five years.
7. Deferred maintenance is at least 40% unfunded.
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8. Short-term bridge financing is required in the final quarter of each fiscal year.
9. Less than 10% of the operating budget is dedicated to technology.
10. Average annual alumni gift is less than $75.
11. Institutional enrollment is 1,000 students or lower.
12. Conversion yield is 20% behind that of primary competitors.
13. Student retention is more than 10% behind primary competitors.
14. The institution is on probation, warning, or financial watch with a regional accreditor
or a specialty degree licensor.
15. The majority of faculty do not hold terminal degrees.
16. Average age of full-time faculty is 58 or higher.
17. The leadership team averages fewer than three years or more than 12 years of service
at the institution.
18. No complete online program has been developed.
19. No new degree or certificate program has been developed for at least two years.
20. Academic governance and curriculum development systems require more than one
year to approve a new degree program.
__________________________________________________________________
Adapted from Turnaround: Leading Stressed Colleges and Universities To Excellence, by J. Martin and J.E. Samels,
2013. p 9-20. Copyright 2013 by Johns Hopkins University Press.

Geyer (2009) conducted a study to assess the statistical significance of leadership on the
growth or decline of 14 universities. The research surveyed over 100 faculty members with an
online instrument to assess the impact of leadership, market orientation, and charisma on the
institution's performance. The data assembled by Geyer showed that the leadership style and
charisma of the president as measured by the Conger-Kanungo measure of charismatic
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leadership had had little statistical impact on the institution's performance (p.138). The data also
showed that an effective leadership style match to the institutional market orientation was typical
and provided a smoother running organization (p.138). However, the study failed to demonstrate
a correlation between market orientation in relation to the growth or decline of the university
(p.141). These findings may indicate that while leadership and market orientation are perceived
as having significant impacts on institutional performance, other factors separate from leadership
or market orientation are driving the institution's performance.
In analyzing the challenges faced by non-selective institutions, Denneen and Dretler
(2012) identified twelve key risk factors which inhibit institutional stability (Table 8). They also
noted that long term debt, interest expense, property, plant and equipment, administrative costs,
and non-core support expenses were the fastest rising expense categories at institutions, and that
the growth of tuition and expenses at a rate of 3.2 times the rate of inflation in 2013 and
projected to accelerate to 6.5 times the rate of inflation by 2030 would make the current
approach unsustainable in the long term.

Table 8
Denneen and Dretler Risk Factors
____________________________________________________________________
1. Admissions levels fall as admissions costs rise.
2. Median salaries for graduates have remained flat for several years.
3. Endowment is small, and a large percentage is restricted.
4. Debt expense increasing faster than instruction expense.
5. Property Plant and Equipment assets are increasing faster than revenue.
6. Declines in tuition revenue.
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7. Institutional bond rating degrades.
8. Trouble accessing government funding.
9. Consistent increases in tuition to the top of the range.
10. Lowering of admission standards to meet enrollment targets.
11. Cutting back on financial aid.
12. Reductions in faculty headcount.
________________________________________________________________________
Adapted from “The Financially Sustainable University: A Focused Strategy Can Help Colleges and Universities
Reinvent Their Industry and Stop Spending Beyond Their Means” by J. Denneen and T. Dretler, 2012. p.7.
Copyright 2013 by Bain & Company.

Lyken-Segosebe and Shepherd (2013) analyzed 57 institutions that closed between 2004
and 2011. They compared the financial and enrollment trends at these institutions relative to their
peer groups. Forty-two percent of the closures were either small religious or non-Carnegie
classified institutions. For those institutions, the ratio of full-time students to part-time students
was four to one at open institutions and below three to one at closed institutions. Additionally,
closed institutions averaged tuition levels of approximately $9,000 per student versus $13,000 at
the institutions that comprised the peer group. Institutions that failed also reported tuition
dependency over 50% of revenues, versus less than 25% for those institutions in the peer group.
This peer group did not include public institutions and indicated a high endowment level and
giving at healthy schools.
Examining the role of tuition discounting and the relationship between the discount rate
and financial vulnerability, Crawford (2017) hypothesized that the impacts of the 2008 recession
had significant impacts on institutional vulnerability and scholarship rates at public institutions
with an enrollment of more than 5,000 students. The study utilized the Financial Vulnerability
Index (FVI) developed by Trussel et al. (2002) discussed above to measure the before and after
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impacts of the recession, particularly changes in tuition discounting, on financial vulnerability.
The findings showed that while tuition and tuition discounting were impacted by the 2008
recession, the financial vulnerability of the institutions remained stable. The assumption made by
the researcher was that institutions adjusted or deferred other spending to account for changes in
funding, and the impacts of changes in state funding, tuition, and discount rates had limited
impacts on the institutional FVI. The study shows that institutions generally managed to
effectively control their financial vulnerability across the observed population by managing the
internal resources and spending. The implication is that administrators and governing bodies
generally can respond with competent action to maintain financial viability if the inputs to those
measures are under their control.
Eide (2018) identified that the failing private colleges included accepting more than half
of all applicants and maintaining high tuition discount levels. The stated tuition levels at many
private institutions are similar – whether Ivy League or non-selective – students require
significant student aid to meet enrollment targets. Eide also noted that the Council of
Independent Colleges put out a report noting that in examining approximately 560 private
schools, those schools with enrollments below 1,000 were financially weaker than institutions
with greater than 1,000 students.
Assessing the impacts of FRR on enrollment trends, Abron (2019) examined the impact
of FRR score on enrollment trends for 37 private 4-year degree-granting historically Black
colleges and universities (HBCUs) from 2006 to 2016. The study found that enrollment and
fiscal responsibility composite scores are significantly correlated, and that accreditation
probation status adversely impacted the FRR score. The probation status and FRR scores
combine to create additional contingencies for the institution. The study explored the concept of
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an “environmental contingency theory” to understand the effect of external factors on financial
performance. The research implied that institutions must develop multiple revenue streams and
focus on fiscal health outside of enrollment and endowment funds. Among the income streams,
Abron analyzes the impact of awarding advanced degrees and the recent trend of HBCUs to
explore these streams considering their traditional undergraduate mission.
The Abron study was limited to a cohort of 37 of 107 total HBCUs. All the institutions in
the Abron study were accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools
Commission on Colleges. This study provides a small sample size, with limited demographic and
geographic diversity, which potentially inhibits the general applicability to a broader base of
institutions.
A similar study limited to 213 Catholic colleges and universities was published by
Agostinelli (2020). That study showed that while increasing enrollment may bring in more
revenue, it did not solve more significant financial responsibility concerns, as the incremental
expenses may offset the revenue gains. Like Abron, Agostinelli found that institutional financial
stability is rooted in improving financial concerns from multiple avenues and that mere increases
in enrollment would not solve all fiscal challenges. The study observed that while there were
statistically significant relationships between FRR scores and student loan default rates and
enrollment levels, those variables had a negligible effect on the FRR scores relative to other
factors.
The study also found that the Catholic religious order played a significant role in the FRR
score. The author suggests that additional research in this area is warranted to better understand
the reasons for this observation.
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Qualitative Based Studies
The literature also contains several case studies of university leadership where
institutions experienced distress and faced closure or, more typically, a turnaround. Examination
of these case studies is helpful to identify commonalities in root causes of distress and
commonalities in corrective action taken by administrators and governing boards. These
commonalities help identify variables for analysis. While generally limited to one to three
institutions, treating these case studies as a meta-analysis reveals several commonalities.
Brockenbrough (2004) examined the use of financial ratios by four populations:
presidents and chief financial officers at HBCUs and non-HBCUs, and whether there was a
difference in their use or perception. The study revealed that CFOs and presidents at HBCU and
majority institutions find financial ratios useful. There was no statistical difference between
HBCU and majority institutions in these measures. However, Brockenbrough noted that CFOs
tend not to have the same level of interest in these ratios as the institutional presidents (pp. 8385). Brockenbrough examines this finding considering several individual ratios and across the
four populations. The general finding was that the use of these ratios is valuable. The use of
ratios assists with communicating the institution’s financial condition and provides input into the
institution’s strategic plan, particularly among non-financial managers and stakeholders. The
study indicates that the ease of ratio analysis in decision-making is not limited to regulatory
agencies and that stakeholders commonly use this approach in the planning and governance
functions.
In their book Turning Around Failing Schools: Leadership Lessons From the
Organizational Sciences (2008), Murphy and Meyers examine the causes and symptoms of
degeneration of educational institutions. While primarily focused on the role of leadership in the
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decline and recovery of institutions, Murphy and Meyers also looked at the financial elements of
institutions. They identified the increasing debt as a significant contributor to university decline.
In addition to debt levels, Murphy and Meyers found that lack of a clear mission and direction
and ineffective administrative management were significant factors in the organizational decline.
This ineffective management extended from the development of a clear mission and vision and a
failure on the part of the administration to honestly assess the institution’s condition, particularly
considering the current market demand, and take action necessary to reverse the institutional
decline. Murphy and Meyers identify leadership inaction and lack of self-assessment and selfawareness considering the people, processes, and systems in which the institution is operating as
precipitating a slow decline over a long period.
Bunn (2010) studied the leadership and turnaround at Lee University within the
framework of Good to Great, the management book by Jim Collins. Bunn identified a focused
improvement pattern in seven areas that the university president identified as critical drivers for
institutional stability and sustainability, as noted in Table 9. While focused mainly on the “good
to great” leadership traits of the university president, Bunn noted that the planned vision and
strategic execution focused on these eight areas within a turnaround framework. Bunn’s analysis
is wholly qualitative. However, the identified areas of focus of the administration are turning
around, and then driving a “good to great” program for the institution is an indicator of critical
elements for institutional sustainability and stability.
Table 9
Bunn’s Good to Great Sustainability Areas of Focus
____________________________________________________________________
1. Enrollment level
2. Campus expansion
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3. Financial resources and endowment levels
4. Institutional reputation
5. Range of student programs
6. Athletics
7. Academic quality
______________________________________________________________________
Adapted from Navigating Change and Leading an Institution of Higher Education: A Case Study of the Missional
Leadership of a University President, by C.E. Bunn, 2010. p.198. Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary
Doctoral Dissertation. Copyright 2010 by C.E. Bunn.

In another case study, Ford (2011) examined the revitalization approach at faith-based
colleges demonstrating financial distress. The dissertation explored revitalization at Davis and
Elkins College, Oral Roberts University, and Mississippi College. Among the common elements
identified by Ford as crucial success measures for turnaround engagement and success included
utilizing compensation raises to signal a return to stability or tying future pay increases to
specific and achievable goals. While staff layoffs were common, faculty layoffs or breaking
tenure was not used. Most importantly, all three institutions relied heavily on fundraising as the
key to revitalizing campus, paying down debt, and stabilizing cash reserves. Ford did not provide
a quantitative analysis of debt levels, fundraising, and cash reserves as crucial elements, though
noting the parallels across the three institutions indicates their importance in institutional
survival.
Whelan (2011) conducted a similar case study on the revitalization of Notre Dame
College of Ohio. In addition to noting that the accreditation reports for Notre Dame College
accurately predicted the distress experienced by the institution nearly a decade before their
existential crisis based on endowment usage and levels, Whelan found that failure to enforce
budget accountability led to financial distress, and required solid presidential leadership to
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correct. The budget failures tended to be associated with program expansions and a lack of goals
and goal review periodically. While the case study was qualitative, identifying endowment level
and budget failures align with the findings noted by the Sturm and Martin and Samels studies.
Carey (2013) conducted a qualitative research study that analyzed the characteristics of
two private universities that successfully executed a turnaround strategy. While extremely
limited in scope and applicability, this study primarily focused on the leadership styles of the
successful turnaround presidents and consisted of interviews of 18 stakeholders. The findings
from the study emphasized that in addition to the ability of the president to provide clarity of
focus and promote the institution's uniqueness, the ability to execute a significant fundraising
effort successfully was critical in both turnaround efforts. Carey (2013) notes that the fundraising
support and the momentum from the fundraising effort helped propel the revitalization of the
institution and drove the infusion of additional resources (pp.110-111). Carey (2013) also notes
that “The impact of fundraising revenue was something not often noted in previous studies
regarding turnaround schools and was a major factor toward success for the two institutions” (p.
vi).
The Miller (2014) study on the failure of Antioch College focused on the impacts of old
and new institutionalism and internal power dynamics as the college attempted to execute a
strategic pivot into distance and non-traditional education. Miller’s conclusions emphasized the
impacts of institutional “saga” (p. 139) on the capabilities of the institution to execute a strategic
pivot, as well as noting that dramatic risk shifts are present when looking to execute an
expansionary pivot, including risks with attracting different student profiles and significant
culture shift. Miller briefly discusses the decision of Antioch, in the face of declining tuition and
enrollment, to execute a bold expansion strategy. However, as is evidenced in many of the
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studies, the root causes of the enrollment declines, which led to the decision to pivot Antioch
University’s strategy, were largely unexplored. The literature Miller reviewed focused on the
decisions by liberal arts colleges to become more comprehensive in their educational offering
and public-school competition as contributing factors in their enrollment declines (pp. 25-27) but
did not explore the demographic shifts which may have led to those decisions.
Summary of Literature
The Leslie and Fretwell four-factor model reflects demographic elements and trends that
are decades old. Much of the intervening research has focused on analyzing financial ratios,
enrollment trends, discounting, economic and non-demographic environmental, leadership and
market factors. Research updating the Leslie and Fretwell findings or integrating demographic
analysis with other performance factors is notably absent in recent literature. Research updating
the Leslie and Fretwell findings or integrating demographic analysis with other performance
factors is notably absent in recent literature.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter discusses the research design and methodology utilized to assess the factors
that impact the potential for closure of faith-based colleges and universities.
Research Design
This quantitative methods study assessed the critical demographic and financial factors
available to regulators, governing boards, and university administrators, which may predict
institutional failure for faith-based, not-for-profit higher education institutions. This correlational
study utilized a longitudinal analysis over five years and is designed to explore the relationships
between 139 data factors and the financial stability of faith-based colleges and universities.
These 139 data factors were then reduced to 13 factors that were assessed to be most likely to be
statistically significant in the determination of institutional health. These 13 factors were
logistically regressed to determine their ability to predict institutional financial fragility or
closure compared to the FRR scores for the same institutions during the observed timeframe.
Research Questions
The objective of the data analysis is to answer the two research questions:
1. What factors predict institutional health for private, faith-based non-profit higher
education institutions as determined by the institution’s inclusion on the Department of
Education’s Heightened Cash Monitoring list in the 2018-2019 Academic Year as
measured by a reported FRR Score below 1.5 for the 2018-2019 Academic Year?
2. What factors can be used to predict institutional closure for private, faith-based non-profit
higher education institutions?
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Data Collection
The quantitative research method utilized in the study consisted of the analysis of 139
data points, exclusive of name, institutional location and religious affiliation data. The data
consists of internal factors, such as institutional financial performance, admissions information,
demographic information, and external factors focusing on local demographic information. The
data were gathered from publicly available sources maintained by the United States Census
Bureau and The United States Department of Education.
It utilizes descriptive statistics and the comparison of means utilizing t-tests between
pairs of cohorts and one-way analysis of variance across the three population cohorts to identify
statistically significant differences between cohorts, identifying potential factors that predict
institutional failure or health for the institution.
By utilizing pairwise t-test analyses across the three cohorts, the study reduced the
number of independent variables from 139 to 13. The 13 independent variables which the study
assessed to have a high probability of being statistically significant in the determination of
institutional health, as defined in the research questions, were:
•

Distance education students enrolled in the Fall semester in the base year 2013-2014.

•

Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Students as reported for the base year 2013-2014.

•

Endowment funds per FTE student reported for the base year 2013-2014.

•

Financial Responsibility Ratio (FRR) as reported for the base year 2013-2014.

•

Full-time staff to FTE student ratio as measured in the base year 2013-2014.

•

6-year graduation rate reported to IPEDS for the base year 2013-2014.

•

2010 Census reported population for the town, city, or smallest metropolitan area
containing the institution.
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•

The percentage of students receiving Pell grants as reported in the base year 20132014.

•

Full-time student to part-time student ratio as calculated for Fall of the base year
2013-2014.

•

First-time, full-time retention rate percentage as reported in the base year 2013-2014.

•

Applicants attending as reported in the base year 2013-2014.

•

Tuition and mandatory fees as reported in the base year 2013-2014.

•

Tuition discount rate for the base year 2013-2014 as calculated by dividing the
institutional support expense by the gross tuition reported by IPEDS.

Data validity may be impacted because some institutions failed to report for all IPEDS
fields, resulting in data values noted as “N/A” in the data tables. These values were removed
from calculations. There were validity risks associated with the selection of the control group.
While the methodology was random, excluding closed and HCM institutions from the list, the
relatively small size of these institutions versus the population may have skewed the control
group towards larger institutions and reduced the randomness.
The statistical analysis conducted in this study may also have Type I or Type II errors. A
Type I error occurs where there is a possibility of error in rejecting the null hypothesis when it is
true. A Type II error occurs when there is an error in not rejecting a null hypothesis when the
alternative hypothesis is true. To reduce the probability of making a Type I error, the
significance level of the tests was set at 95%. To reduce the probability of a Type II error, the
entire populations of HCM and closed institutions were utilized. A relatively large sample of
institutions not in the HCM or closed cohorts was utilized.
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Because the research conducted did not include any human subjects, the study is exempt
from review by the Marshall University Office of Research Integrity Institutional Review Board.
The exemption letter is attached as Appendix J.
Population
The entire population set of faith-based, not-for-profit higher education institutions under
Heightened Cash Monitoring (HCM) as of June 1, 2016, is attached as Appendix A and
represents one analysis cohort. Utilizing data provided by Busta (2020), a list of 12 institutions
closing between 2016 and 2020 was compiled and is attached as Appendix C to this dissertation
and comprises the closed cohort.
The control group of 100 institutions (Appendix B) used in the study represents 17% of
the approximately 593 faith-based, not-for-profit private institutions not on HCM in 2016.
The confidence interval that this sample population represents the 593-faith based notfor-profit institutions, not on HCM in 2016 is calculated as follows:
:

1. Confidence Level desired – 95%, resulting in a z-value of 1.96
2. The sample proportion (p) was calculated as 100/593, or .1683
3. The sample proportion multiplied by 1-p = .14
4. The result from Step 3 was divided by the sample size (N) of 100 to arrive at .0014
5. The square root of the result of Step 4 results in a value of .0374
6. Multiplying the standard error by the confidence level of 1.96 results in 7.33%.
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This calculation resulted in an approximate 7% margin of error with a 95% confidence
interval that the sample population reflects the general population. This control group was
selected by listing the 593-faith based not-for-profit private institutions not on HCM in 2016 in a
worksheet in Microsoft Excel and then utilizing the RAND function in Excel to assign a random
number to each institution. The combined columns of random number and corresponding
institution were sorted by the assigned random value from smallest to largest, resulting in a sort
order of completely random institutions. The first 100 institutions from the randomly generated
list were then used as the control group.
Instrumentation and Data
Utilizing the Financial Responsibility Composite Scores database published by the
United States Department of Education, a dataset of the FRR scores for these institutions
identified in the Appendix was compiled from the 2013-2014 academic year through the 20182019 academic year. This dataset was available as a downloadable Excel file.
Utilizing the National Center for Education Statistics Integrated Postsecondary Education
Data System (IPEDS) (National Center for Education Statistics, 2020a), the population cohort
data were augmented with fall enrollment data, admissions and test scores data, graduation rate
data, student financial and net price data, human resources data, and financial data for academic
years 2013-2014 and 2018-2019. IPDES is the primary data collection system for the United
States Department of Education and provides a standardized data format and set of
questionnaires to gather data from higher education institutions participating in Department of
Education Title IV financial aid programs. The National Center for Education Statistics
published the 2012 Revision of NCES Statistical Standards: Final (National Center for Education
Statistics, 2012), which provides a standardized methodology for data gathering. (This dataset
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was available as a .csv file.) The primary instrument used to collect this data is an annual
questionnaire submitted by institutions to the United States Department of Education, comprised
of the annual financial statement audit and a report of financial position submitted as required by
Section 498(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1965, commonly known as the IPEDS data
collection questionnaire.
Utilizing data available from the United States Census Bureau QuickFacts (United States
Census Bureau QuickFacts, 2020) information, changes in population estimate for the state and
locality as a percentage, the median income, poverty rate, and local racial demographic data was
added to the dataset for the period 2010-2020. The United States Census Bureau conducts a
comprehensive population survey every ten years and publishes the data on state and local
populations. The Census Bureau data are updated periodically for changes in local population
estimates and published on the Bureau website. Because the Census Bureau data is collected
decennially, the study treats the trends in demographic and census data from 2010 to 2020 as
applying to the subset period studied here.
The data was downloaded from the sources and placed into tables by academic year. The
identified variables utilized the institutional name as the primary standard data key between the
sources. A list of the data fields, calculations, and sources is attached as Appendix D.
The study utilized Microsoft Excel with Analysis Tool Pak for data analysis.

42

Data Analysis
The study engaged in a two-step quantitative analysis. The first step of the analysis
consisted of pairwise t-test analyses across the three cohorts to reduce the number of independent
variables from 139 to 13. The study utilized the Excel Data Analysis Tool Pak function “t-Test:
Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances” to assess where the mean values were statistically
different between the three cohorts and looked at both one and two tail significance. Thirteen
variables were then identified based on the pairwise t-tests and summary descriptive statistics for
inclusion in the logistic regression model.
In the second step, a logistic regression model was used to determine the probability of
whether an institution would be subject to the Department of Education’s Heightened Cash
Monitoring program or would close or not based on the 13 variables identified. Logistic
regression is a common method for determining a predictive probability when analyzing binary
dependent variables with a data set of non-binary independent variables. The study utilized
Microsoft Excel with Data Analysis ToolPak as the primary analysis software. The study utilized
Excel because most stakeholders would have access to and familiarity with the software. It also
makes it easier for future updates of the Study over time by a broad base of researchers who may
not have access to, or familiarity with, more sophisticated statistical software packages.
To conduct logistic regression in Excel, the study followed the following steps, derived
from Buskirk (2017):
Step 1: Input the data for each institutional observation.
Step 2: Enter 14 cells for regression coefficients – one for each independent variable and
one for the intercept in the model.
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Step 3: Create the logit for each observation by multiplying each independent variable by
the regression coeffit, summing the results, and then adding the intercept coefficient.
Step 4: Calculate the value of elogit for each observation by utilizing the “=EXP()” Excel
formula function.
Step 5: Calculate the probability for each observation utilizing the following Excel
formula: “=1/(1+elogit)”.
Step 6: Calculate the natural logarithm of the probability (“Log Probability”) of each
observation utilizing the “=LN()” Excel formula function.
Step 7: Sum the Log Probability for all observations.
Step 8: Utilize the Solver function in Excel to maximize the value of the Log Probability
by changing the regression coefficients established in Step 2. This will calculate the regression
coefficient probability that the dependent variable will equal 0.
Step 9: Multiply the results of Step 8 by -1 to calculate the probability that the dependent
variable will equal 1.
Step 10: The regression coefficients can be used to find the probability that the dependent
variable will equal 1 (on HCM or Closed) utilizing the formula: Probability =
e(b0+b1(x1)+b2(x2)…+b15(x15) / 1+ e(b0+b1(x1)+b2(x2)…+b13(x13)
To answer the first research question, the study utilized logistic regression utilizing the 13
independent variables identified in the first step against a binary dependent variable of whether
an institution had an FRR score under 1.5 in the academic year 2018-2019 and therefore was
subject to the Department of Education’s Heightened Cash Monitoring program. The logistic
regression calculated a probability based on the 13 independent variables that the institution
would be subject to inclusion in the Department of Education’s Heightened Cash Monitoring
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program five years after the measurement date. Excel was utilized to conduct the analysis. This
result was then compared to a logistic regression model utilizing the FRR score for the 20132014 academic year as the sole independent variable, and the results were analyzed.
To answer the second research question, the study performed a logistic regression
utilizing the 13 independent variables identified in the first step against a binary dependent
variable of whether an institution had closed or announced its closure by 2020. The logistic
regression calculated a probability based on the 13 independent variables that an institution
would close or announce closure within five years of the measurement date. This result was then
compared to a logistic regression model utilizing only the FRR score for the 2013-2014
academic year and the results analyzed.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
Introduction
The study investigated the possibility that improved multivariate modeling factoring in
variables beyond just the FRR score would better predict the likelihood that an institution would
close or experience financial fragility as measured by having an FRR score below 1.5 and being
placed on the United States Department of Education Heightened Cash Monitoring list.
The first step of the analysis calculated descriptive statistics and pairwise t-test analysis
across three cohorts of institutions to reduce the number of factors from 139 to 13. The second
step utilized logistic regression analysis to predict the probability of imminent financial fragility
or closure.
The study compiled FRR and HCM information available from the United States
Department of Education, information from the National Center for Education Statistics
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) with information on institutional
enrollment data, student demographic data, tuition data, financial data categorized by Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles classification, endowment level, admissions rate, and tuition
discount rate. Additionally, the study analyzed localized population and economic data gathered
from the United States Census Bureau and the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Descriptive Statistics
The data points were first analyzed to calculate the descriptive statistics across the three
populations. The three cohorts' mean, standard deviation, and ranges were assembled and
calculated across the 139 quantitative data points. The results of these calculations by cohort are
summarized in Appendix E for the closed cohort, Appendix F for those institutions in the
Heightened Cash Monitoring cohort, and Appendix G for the control group of institutions.
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To isolate probable predictive independent variables, the 2013-2014 academic year data
were analyzed for statistically significant differences in the means between the three cohorts of
institutions. The screening criteria for the independent variables included the information that
would have been available to the institution during the 2013-2014 academic year and where the
mean difference was statistically different between the three cohorts. The study analyzed both
one and two tail significance of a difference at a minimum of 90% confidence either in the 20132014 means, or a similar confidence interval in the mean percentage change of that variable
between the 2013-2014 and 2018-2019 data.
Thirteen variables were then identified based on the pairwise t-tests and summary
descriptive statistics for inclusion in the logistic regression model. The descriptive statistics for
the thirteen variables selected are shown in Table 10 below:
Table 10
Select Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables Used in Logistic Regression Model
____________________________________________________________________
Variable

Closed Mean

HCM Mean

Non-HCM
Mean

14.05

ClosedHCM 1
Tailed Test
Confidence
67.03%

Closed-Non
HCM 1
Tailed Test
Confidence
93.87%

HCM-Non
HCM 1
Tailed Test
Confidence
91.78%

FT/PT Student
Ratio – 5
Distance Ed –
5
FT StaffStudent -5
FTE Students
-5
6 Year
Graduation
Rate - 5
FRR - 5
Applicants
Attending - 5
2010
Population
Endowment
Funds -5

8.87

10.37

15.00

97.76

94.16

93.28%

99.99%

93.64%

8.54

6.80

7.03

76.44%

84.65%

66.48%

1,471.25

820.50

2,076.91

84.39%

81.81%

99.99%

35.36%

41.89%

51.38%

92.86%

99.98%

99.86%

1.65
178.89

1.10
164.82

2.19
349.64

99.35%
60.10%

99.58%
99.45%

99.99%
99.99%

97,465.58

121,152.47

186,700.09

66.08%

91.47%

91.77%

8,500,899.25

11,219,427.45

54,386,608.81

85.10%

99.99%

99.99%
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Pell Grant
Percentage – 5
FTFT
Retention – 5
Tuition and
Fees – 5
Tuition
Discount Rate
-5

55.67%

53.66%

44.08%

64.47%

98.67%

99.64%

65.33%

66.21%

71.07%

58.34%

94.07%

95.28%

22,090.67

18,275.14

24,096.34

95.13%

82.93%

99.99%

40.30%

37.85%

48.30%

67.97%

95.56%

99.75%

______________________________________________________________________

The full-time staff to student ratio was the only variable that did not meet a minimum
90% confidence in a mean difference between any two cohorts. This was utilized because the
differences in the means of both components – full-time staff and FTE students - were
statistically significant at a 95% or higher confidence interval across cohorts, as can be seen in
Appendix O. However, both variables correlate strongly with each other on institutional size.
The researcher elected to analyze the ratio to normalize the impact of gross institutional size and
instead analyze the impact of institutional staffing levels relative to the student population on the
probability of closure or inclusion in the Department of Education’s Heightened Cash
Monitoring program.
Logistic Regression
Logistic regression is utilized when the dependent variable is categorical. This study has
two categorical dependent variables – (a) whether an institution was on the Department of
Education’s Heightened Cash Monitoring program, and (b) whether an institution closed or had
announced a pending closure. In this case, the logistic regression is binary – meaning that the
institution does not meet the criteria noted above.
As noted by Robinson (2018), logistic regression has several limitations. Logistic
regression requires that each data point be independent of other data points. Failure to achieve
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complete independence will tend to overweight the significance of those observations. Logistic
regression does not require that the relationship between the independent and dependent
variables is either linear or normally distributed. The researcher selected variables based on their
statistical significance and relative independence to reduce this propensity to overweight specific
financial data available as part of the FRR score.
This study’s logistic regression analysis portion utilized Microsoft Excel for Microsoft
365 MSO, version 2110. The use of Excel for the logistic regression was based on two factors –
the first being the ease of use for the typical stakeholder to replicate the results, and the second
being its near-ubiquitous availability both inside and outside the academy. Utilizing Excel,
however, requires a caveat to the researcher. The Solver function in Excel is heavily dependent
on the initial assumed value for each variable. This study used an initial value of 0.00001 for all
variables.
The modeling process resulted in the following logistic regression coefficients for
predicting the institution’s closure. These variables are the components for calculating the logit
and cannot be directly utilized to predict closure:
Table 11
Regression Coefficients Predicting Closure – 13 Variable Model
____________________________________________________________________
Variable
Constant
FT/PT Student Ratio – 5
Distance Ed – 5
FT Staff-Student -5
FTE Students - 5
6 Year Graduation Rate - 5
FRR - 5
Applicants Attending - 5
2010 Population
Endowment Funds -5
Pell Grant Percentage – 5

Coefficient
0.00251316454
0.05551489069
0.0366797261
0.01580695503
-0.00068033549
0.00126474595
0.00379987396
0.00625989358
0.00000421162
0.00003602459
0.00093661678
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FTFT Retention – 5
Tuition and Fees – 5
Tuition Discount Rate - 5

0.00126653396
-0.00001864051
0.0003220366

____________________________________________________________________
The modeling process also resulted in the following logistic regression coefficients for
predicting the financial fragility of an institution, as measured by inclusion on the Department of
Education’s Heightened Cash Monitoring list. These variables are the components for calculating
the logit and cannot be directly utilized to predict financial fragility:
Table 12
Regression Coefficients Predicting Financial Fragility – 13 Variable Model
____________________________________________________________________
Variable
Constant
FT/PT Student Ratio – 5
Distance Ed – 5
FT Staff-Student -5
FTE Students - 5
6 Year Graduation Rate - 5
FRR - 5
Applicants Attending - 5
2010 Population
Endowment Funds -5
Pell Grant Percentage – 5
FTFT Retention – 5
Tuition and Fees – 5
Tuition Discount Rate - 5

Coefficient
-0.00000214086
0.00000650916
-0.00079854044
-0.00011613581
0.00019304577
0.00001554501
0.00009805158
0.00394854393
0.00000047250
0.0000171654
-0.00000460494
0.00000286132
-0.00003244059
0.00001291683

____________________________________________________________________
The coefficients need to be multiplied by the independent variable value to calculate the
probabilities of closure or financial fragility. This calculation provides the researcher with the
logit value. This value is then applied using the =EXP function in Excel, which gives the
constant e (approximately 2.718) to the value of the calculated logit. Mathematically, this would
be displayed as elogit. This value is then evaluated using the equation 1/1+ elogit to determine the
probability.
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The researcher performed the same calculation utilizing only FRR score as an
independent variable to answer the research questions. The coefficient results of that logistic
regression are shown in Table 14:
Table 13
Regression Coefficients FRR Only Models
____________________________________________________________________
Closure Scenario
Variable
Constant
FRR - 5

Coefficient
0.574880035
1.061364955

Financial Fragility Scenario
Variable
Constant
FRR - 5

Coefficient
-2.057131482
1.576012922

____________________________________________________________________

Findings
First Research Question
The first research question asks: What factors predict institutional health for private,
faith-based non-profit higher education institutions as determined by the inclusion of the
institution on the Department of Education’s Heightened Cash Monitoring list in the 2018-2019
Academic Year as measured by a reported FRR Score below 1.5 for the 2018-2019 Academic
Year?
The study ran the logistic regression of the FRR only and the thirteen variable model to
determine the calculated probability that an institution would appear on the 2018-2019 HCM list.
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A count of those predicting a greater than 50% probability was compared to the published HCM
list. A summary of the results is as follows:
Utilizing the FRR score alone, of the 54 institutions closed or on HCM at 2018-2019
academic year, the model correctly predicted that 32 out of 54 of the institutions appearing on
the list would have a better than even chance of appearing five years prior, or a 59.25% accuracy.
The highest predicted correct probability was 97.425% for Ohio Valley University, and the
lowest predicted probability for those appearing on the list was 6.471% for Maple Springs
Baptist Bible College and Seminary. The mean probability across the 54 institutions utilizing this
model was 54.404%, and the standard deviation was 23.875%.
Utilizing the FRR score alone, of the 100 institutions in the control group that did not
appear on the 2018-2019 HCM list, the model correctly predicted that 88 out of 100 institutions
would not have a better than even chance to appear on the HCM list in 2018-2019, an 88%
accuracy. The highest predicted probability of these institutions appearing on the list was
95.270% for Northeast Catholic College, and the lowest predicted probability was 6.471% for
Averett University. The mean probability across the 100 control institutions utilizing this model
was 24.622%, and the standard deviation was 20.109%.
Conducting the same analysis on the thirteen-factor model of the 54 institutions closed or
on HCM at 2018-2019 academic year, the model correctly predicted that 19 out of 54 of the
institutions appearing on the list would have a better than even chance of appearing five years
prior, or a 35.19% accuracy. The highest predicted correct probability was 63.192% for
Unification Theological Seminary, and the lowest predicted probability for those appearing on
the list was 16.58% for Virginia Wesleyan College. The mean probability across the 54
institutions utilizing this model was 42.609%, and the standard deviation was 12.98%.
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Utilizing the thirteen-factor model of the 100 institutions in the control group that did not
appear on the 2018-2019 HCM list, the model correctly predicted that 84 out of 100 institutions
would not have a better than even chance to appear on the HCM list in 2018-2019, an 84%
accuracy. The highest predicted probability of these institutions appearing on the list was
64.193% for Providence Christian College, and the lowest predicted probability was 0.001% for
Fordham University. The mean probability across the 100 control institutions utilizing this model
was 28.948%, and the standard deviation was 17.40%.
The results were then analyzed utilizing the Excel t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming
Unequal Variances function both within and across models for significance. Within the thirteenfactor model, the t-test evaluating the differences of the means of the probabilities between the
institutions on HCM and those that were not on HCM was statistically significant at the 99.99%
level – indicating that while the probability percentage may have limited value, the factors within
the calculation are demonstrating significant differences between the two populations. Similarly,
within the FRR only model, the t-test evaluating the differences of the means of the probabilities
between the institutions on HCM and those that were not on HCM was statistically significant at
the 99.99% level – indicating that while the probability percentage may have limited value, the
FRR is a directionally correct predictor of future financial fragility.
A second analysis examined the differences between the mean probabilities across the
thirteen-factor and FRR only models. Across the two models, the differences in the means of the
probabilities for predicting the institutions that were on HCM were statistically significant at the
99.78% confidence level, with the FRR score alone model appearing to be the more accurate
predictor of financial fragility as measured by inclusion on the HCM list five years hence based
on the correct prediction statistics and the probability measures.
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The same cross-modal analysis was also conducted on the non-HCM institutions. Across
the two models, the differences in the means of the probabilities for predicting the institutions
that were not going to appear on HCM were statistically significant at the 89.28% confidence
level, with the FRR score alone model appearing to be the more accurate predictor of financial
fragility as measured by inclusion on the HCM list five years hence based on the correct
prediction statistics and the probability measures.
The results of these calculations may be found in Appendix H.
In answering the first research question, it appears that the best predictor of the financial
fragility of an institution in five years based on the analyzed measures is the current year FRR
score. Suppose a stakeholder uses a 50% probability cutoff based on the model that an institution
will or will not subsequently appear on the FRR list in 5 years. In that case, there is a 77.92%
chance that the model will have returned the correct binary outcome versus a 67.14% chance for
the thirteen-factor model.

Second Research Question
The second research question was: What factors can be used to predict institutional
closure for private, faith-based non-profit higher education institutions?
The study ran the logistic regression of the FRR only and the thirteen variable model to
determine the calculated probability that an institution would close or announce the closure. A
count of those predicting a greater than 20% probability was compared to the published HCM
list. A 20% probability was utilized in this scenario because examining a 5-year time horizon
corresponded to a one in five probability for closure. Additionally, the severity of an institutional
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closure would warrant a lower probability threshold for stakeholder action. A summary of the
results are as follows:
Utilizing the FRR score alone, of the 12 institutions closed or on HCM at 2018-2019
academic year, the model correctly predicted that 2 out of 12 of the institutions appearing on the
list would have a better than 20% chance of closing five years prior, or a 16.67% accuracy. The
highest predicted correct probability was 36.011% for Urbana University, and the lowest
predicted probability for those appearing on the list was 3.811% for Martin Methodist College.
The mean probability across the 12 institutions utilizing this model was 12.06%, and the standard
deviation was 8.80%.
Utilizing the FRR score alone, of the 143 institutions in the control group and HCM
group that did not announce the closure, the model correctly predicted that 123 out of 143
institutions would not have a higher than 20% rate of closure, an 86.6% accuracy measure given
the parameters. The highest predicted probability of these institutions appearing on the list was
61.928% for Ohio Valley University, and the lowest predicted probability was 2.278% for Maple
Springs Baptist Bible College and Seminary. The mean probability across the 143 control
institutions utilizing this model was 10.560%, and the standard deviation was 10.86%. The FRR
only model predicted three institutions with a greater than 50% chance of closure within five
years – Northeast Catholic College (51.548%), Emmanuel College (59.396%), and Ohio Valley
University (61.928%). All three institutions remain open as of November 2021.
Conducting the same analysis on the thirteen-factor model of the 12 institutions closed or
having announced closure before the 2020 academic year and for which dada were available, the
model correctly predicted that 7 out of 12 of the institutions appearing on the list would have a
better 20% chance of closure within the following five years, or a 58.33% accuracy. The highest
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predicted correct probability was 44.696% for Urbana University, and the lowest predicted
probability for those appearing on the list was 4.597% for MacMurray College. The mean
probability across the 12 institutions utilizing this model was 21.504%, and the standard
deviation was 13.429%.
Of the 143 institutions in the control group and HCM group that did not announce the
closure, the model correctly predicted that 119 out of 143 institutions would not have a higher
than 20% rate of closure, an 83.2% accuracy measure given the parameters. The highest
predicted probability of these institutions appearing on the list was 55.527% for William Carey
University, and the lowest predicted probability was 0.000% for 17 institutions. The mean
probability across the 143 control institutions utilizing this model was 8.615%, and the standard
deviation was 12.305%. The thirteen-factor model predicted two institutions with a greater than
50% chance of closure within five years – Yeshiva Shaarei Torah of Rockland (50.301%) and
William Carey University (55.527%). Both institutions remain open as of November 2021.
The results were then analyzed utilizing the Excel t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming
Unequal Variances function both within and across models for significance. Within the thirteenfactor model, the t-test evaluating the means of the probabilities between closed institutions and
open institutions was statistically significant at the 99.53% level – indicating that while the
probability percentage may have limited value, the factors within the calculation are
demonstrating significant differences between the two populations. However, within the FRR
only model, the t-test evaluating the means of the probabilities between the institutions that were
closed and not closed was not statistically significant – with a two-tailed t of 1.76 and only a
39.76% confidence that the means are statistically different. This result indicates that the
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thirteen-factor model appears to be directionally correct. Utilizing the FRR only model provides
little better predictive power than a random chance that the results will predict closure.
A second analysis looked at the differences between the mean probabilities across the
two models. Across the two models, the differences in the means of the probabilities for
predicting the institutions that were closed were statistically significant at the 93.41% confidence
level, with the thirteen-factor model appearing to be the more accurate predictor of closure five
years hence based on the correct prediction statistics and the probability measures.
The same cross-modal analysis was conducted on the non-closed institutions as well.
Across the two models, the differences in the means of the probabilities for predicting the
institutions that were not going to close were statistically significant at the 83.06% confidence
level, with the thirteen-factor model appearing to be the more accurate predictor of the
probability that the institution will remain open five years hence based on the correct prediction
statistics and the probability measures.
The results of these calculations may be found in Appendix I.
The averages for the sample population in Appendix B were modeled utilizing the
thirteen-factor model. The output resulted in a predicted 0.28% probability that the average
institution listed in Appendix B would close within the next five years.
Each independent variable was then adjusted to determine the impacts of a change on the
probability of closure while holding all other variables constant. Following these changes in the
values of the independent variables, the following impacts were noted:
For the independent variable “Distance education students enrolled in the Fall semester in
the base year 2013-2014”, an increase of 10%, from an initial value of 94.1616 to 103.5778,
resulted in a decrease in the probability of closure from 0.28% to 0.20%. A corresponding 10%

57

decrease from 94.1616 to 84.7454 resulted in an increase in the probability of closure from
0.28% to 0.39%.
For the independent variable “Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Students as reported for the
base year 2013-2014”, an increase of 10%, from an initial value of 2,076.9091 to 2,284.6,
resulted in an increase in the probability of closure from 0.28% to 0.32%. A corresponding 10%
decrease from 2,076.9091 to 1,869.2182 resulted in a decrease in the probability of closure from
0.28% to 0.24%.
For the independent variable “Endowment funds per FTE student as reported for the base
year 2013-2014”, an increase of 10%, from an initial value of $26,186.32 to $28,804.95, resulted
in a decrease in the probability of closure from 0.28% to 0.25%. A corresponding 10% decrease
from $26,186.32 to $23,567.69 resulted in an increase in the probability of closure from 0.28%
to 0.30%.
For the independent variable “Financial Responsibility Ratio (FRR) as reported for the
base year 2013-2014,” an increase of 10%, from an initial value of 2.1888 to 2.4077, resulted in
less than a 0.0003% decrease in the probability of closure. A corresponding 10% decrease saw a
similar 0.0002% increase in the probability of closure.
For the independent variable “Full-time staff to FTE student ratio as measured in the base
year 2013-2014”, an increase of 10%, from an initial value of 6.3733 to 7.0106, resulted in a
decrease in the probability of closure from 0.28% to 0.27%. A corresponding 10% decrease from
6.3733 to 5.7360 increased the probability of closure by less than .002%.
For the independent variable “6-year graduation rate reported to IPEDS for the base year
2013-2014”, an increase of 10%, from an initial value of 51.79% to 56.97%, resulted in a
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decrease in the probability of closure of less than 0.0001%. A corresponding 10% decrease from
51.79% to 46.61% increased the probability of closure by less than 0.0001%.
For the independent variable, “2010 Census reported population for the town, city or
smallest metropolitan area containing the institution”, an increase of 10%, from an initial value
of 186,700.09 to 205,370.01, resulted in a decrease in the probability of closure from 0.28% to
0.26%. A corresponding 10% decrease from 186,700.09 to 168,030.08 resulted in an increase in
the probability of closure from 0.28% to 0.30%.
For the independent variable “The percentage of students receiving Pell grants as
reported in the base year 2013-2014,” an increase of 10%, from an initial value of 44.08% to
48.49%, resulted in a decrease in the probability of closure of less than 0.0001%. A
corresponding 10% decrease from 44.08% to 39.67% increased the probability of closure by less
than 0.0001%.
For the independent variable “Full-time student to part-time student ratio as calculated for
Fall of the base year 2013-2014”, an increase of 10%, from an initial value of 4.7531 to 5.2284,
resulted in a decrease in the probability of closure from 0.28% to 0.27%. A corresponding 10%
decrease from 4.7531 to 4.2778 resulted in an increase in the probability of closure by 0.007%.
For the independent variable “First-time, full-time retention rate percentage as reported in
the base year 2013-2014”, an increase of 10%, from an initial value of 71.07% to 78.18%,
resulting in a decrease in the probability of closure of less than 0.0001%. A corresponding 10%
decrease from 71.07% to 63.96% increased the probability of closure by less than 0.0001%.
For the independent variable “Applicants attending as reported in the base year 20132014”, an increase of 10%, from an initial value of 349.6364 to 384.6, resulted in a decrease in
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the probability of closure from 0.28% to 0.22%. A corresponding 10% decrease from 349.6364
to 314.6728 resulted in an increase in the probability of closure from 0.28% to 0.34%
For the independent variable “Tuition and mandatory fees as reported in the base year
2013-2014”, an increase of 10%, from an initial value of $24,096.34 to $26,505.97, resulted in
an increase in the probability of closure from 0.28% to 0.29%. A corresponding 10% decrease
from $24,096.34 to $21,686.71 resulted in a decrease in the probability of closure from 0.28% to
0.26%.
For the independent variable “Tuition discount rate for the base year 2013-2014 as
calculated by dividing the institutional support expense by the gross tuition as reported by
IPEDS”, an increase of 10%, from an initial value of 48.79% to 53.67%, resulted in a decrease in
the probability of closure of less than 0.0001%. A corresponding 10% decrease from 48.79% to
43.91% increased the probability of closure by less than 0.0001%.
The calculator used to perform this data analysis is available at the following
URL: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1i0vRuNCpxXuYuARdK9hXOwnmOkuiQIeG1R
Spezya_8o/edit?usp=sharing
In answering the second research question, it appears that the better predictor of
institutional closure in five years based on the analyzed measures is a multifactor model, which
includes but is not exclusive to the FRR score. The FRR score alone provides little more than a
random coin flip about whether the institution will remain open or close within the next five
years.
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Introduction
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine financial and demographic
factors which may predict institutional failure for faith-based, not-for-profit higher education
institutions. This study aimed to provide insights into critical influences on institutional financial
performance for use by governing boards, administrators, and regulatory agencies.
Summary of Findings
The first step of the analysis calculated descriptive statistics and pairwise t-test analysis
across three cohorts of institutions to reduce the number of factors from 139 to 13. The second
step utilized logistic regression analysis to predict the probability of imminent financial fragility
or closure.
Utilizing multivariate logistic regression, the study built a model that predicts
institutional closure better than the commonly used Financial Responsibility Ratio (FRR). The
study applied this model to two research questions:
1. What factors predict institutional health for private, faith-based non-profit higher
education institutions as determined by the institution’s inclusion on the Department of
Education’s Heightened Cash Monitoring list in the 2018-2019 Academic Year as
measured by a reported FRR Score below 1.5 for the 2018-2019 Academic Year?
2. What factors can be used to predict institutional closure for private, faith-based non-profit
higher education institutions?
In response to the first research question, it appears that the FRR score as currently
utilized is a better predictor of the financial fragility of an institution in five years based on the
analyzed measures. Suppose a stakeholder uses a 50% probability cutoff based on the model that
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an institution will or will not subsequently appear on the FRR list in 5 years. In that case, there is
a 77.92% chance that the model will have returned the correct binary outcome versus a 67.14%
chance for the thirteen-factor model.
However, in response to the second research question, where the question is the ability to
predict the closure of an institution, it appears that the thirteen-factor model proves a better
predictor of institutional closure in five years based on the analyzed measures a multi-factor
model which includes but is not exclusive to the FRR score. The FRR score alone provides little
more than a random coin flip about whether the institution will remain open or close within the
next five years. Utilizing a lower 20% probability of closure as the threshold for stakeholder
intervention, the thirteen-factor model correctly predicted 58.33% of the institutions that
ultimately failed and correctly predicted 83.2% of the institutions that remained open in the
subsequent five-year period. This compares to the FRR score only – which correctly predicted
only 16.67% of the institutions that ultimately failed.
Several independent variables responded significantly to the sensitivity analysis and may
be influenced by institutions looking to mitigate their risk factors for closure. The most
significant variables falling within this category included the number of distance education
students, where each additional student reduced the probability of closure by approximately
0.01% in the model. A second impact is a corresponding reduction in the number of FTE
students. Basic math would indicate that the higher the distance education to FTE student ratio is
based on this model, the less likely the institution will close. Based on the literature review or
other studies, this result was not expected or predicted.
Several independent variables in this controllable category were expected to be more
influential than they proved to be in the model. The FRR score, the 6-year graduation rate, the
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Pell Grant percentage, the retention rate, and the tuition discount rate had relatively low
sensitivity on the model when a 10% change was applied. Each of those variables is also
relatively difficult for an institution to quickly effect significant changes.
The researcher’s experience as a Chief Business Officer at one of the institutions
appearing on the Department of Education’s Heightened Cash Monitoring list in this study
during the period studied was that governing boards and financial institutions tend to focus on
the simplistic FRR score as an indicator for institutional financial risk. However, while the FRR
score appears to have the ability to predict that a private religiously affiliated higher education
institution will continue to have a low FRR score five years on, it provides little value in
determining if an institution will remain open at that same five-year point.
Instead, a multi-factor model focusing on the student body, local population, financial
aid, and student success in addition to the FRR score (See Table 12), provides a significantly
more accurate indicator of closure risk.
Recommendations for Stakeholders
While the FRR score is required for reporting to the United States Department of
Education and is utilized as an indicator of financial fragility, the FRR score is an incomplete
view of the holistic financial health of the university and a poor predictor of closure within the
subsequent five years.
The link below provides Google Sheets access to the probability calculator. Based on the
model, if an institution shows a higher than 20% probability of closure, the stakeholders should
look to take remedial action to ensure that the institution is financially and operationally
managed in such a way as to mitigate the risk of closure. Based on the institution’s baseline data
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and manipulation of the model, the institutional stakeholders can determine which changes will
have the highest impact in reducing the probability of closure.
The model may be found at the following link:
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1i0vRuNCpxXuYuARdK9hXOwnmOkuiQIeG1RSpezy
a_8o/edit?usp=sharing
A simplistic application of the findings of this study by a governing board based on the
findings of the model would be, for example, to increase the number of distance education
students at a high discount rate to stave off institutional failure. This approach would be
shortsighted and potentially detrimental to the institution’s long-term viability. While the model
and study identify factors for consideration in developing a strategy, the model development and
limitations in the data discussed throughout the study do not make it the final word in either
predicting institutional closure or developing mitigation strategies.
There are other variables – some of which (such as institutional culture, majors offered,
limitations in the ability on the part of governing boards, administration, faculty and staff, and
athletic programs to name a few) were not included in this study and are often more qualitative.
Stakeholders should apply the lessons learned from this study as part of a holistic approach to
institutional strategy development and risk mitigation.
Generalizability
The dataset was limited to a small subset of religiously affiliated higher education
institutions. Only 12 institutions closed or announced closure during the period, and the data
available for several of those institutions were limited in IPEDS. In addition, the study looked at
a small segment in time. Therefore, the findings from the study may not apply to a broader
population.
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Recommendations for Further Research
One of the most interesting elements from the study results was that institutions with a
high level of distance education students tended to have a very low probability of closure. The
researcher’s experience with distance education as an administrator, faculty member, and student
would indicate that the cost for delivery is significantly lower than with traditional students,
while the tuition differential between distance education tuition and traditional on-campus tuition
is often de minimis. Given this finding, additional research on the relationship between financial
fragility, institutional closure, and distance education is warranted.
This study utilized five years from the academic years 2013-2014 to 2018-2019. These
factors may change over time, and additional research for differing periods and lengths of time
provides indications of changes in both the composition and the magnitude of the predictor
variables.
The study utilized Microsoft Excel and Google Sheets for the regression analysis. The
choice to utilize these tools derived from the near-ubiquitous availability and ease of use for
stakeholders – particularly governing board members – in assessing their institution’s financial
health and updating the model moving forward. Additional research using a more robust
statistical modeling package, supporting a complete logistic regression across 139 factors, and
optimizing for predictive power may result in additional insights and predictive ability of closure
and financial fragility.
Research conducting a similar analysis across secular private and public institutions and
comparing them to the results of this study may provide future researchers with commonalities in
predicting financial fragility and closure across higher education institutions. Stakeholders may
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then utilize this study in developing broader mitigation strategies and key performance indicators
for higher education institutions beyond the FRR score.
Conclusion
The findings of this study suggest that while the FRR score provides a reasonable
indication of financial fragility over a subsequent five-year period, it is little better than a coin
flip in predicting whether a religiously affiliated higher education institution will be financially
troubled enough to close within that period. The study found that using a multi-factor model to
predict closure results in higher predictive accuracy during the observed period.
Based on the findings of this study, the researcher identified the following 13 factors that
appear to provide insights into the probability of institutional closure:
•

Distance education students enrolled in the Fall semester in the base year 2013-2014.

•

Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Students reported for the base year 2013-2014.

•

Endowment funds per FTE student reported for the base year 2013-2014.

•

Financial Responsibility Ratio (FRR) as reported for the base year 2013-2014.

•

Full-time staff to FTE student ratio as measured in the base year 2013-2014.

•

6-year graduation rate reported to IPEDS for the base year 2013-2014.

•

2010 Census reported population for the town, city, or smallest metropolitan area
containing the institution.

•

The percentage of students receiving Pell grants as reported in the base year 2013-2014.

•

Full-time student to part-time student ratio as calculated for Fall of the base year 20132014.

•

First-time, full-time retention rate percentage as reported in the base year 2013-2014.

•

Applicants attending as reported in the base year 2013-2014.
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•

Tuition and mandatory fees as reported in the base year 2013-2014.

•

Tuition discount rate for the base year 2013-2014 as calculated by dividing the
institutional support expense by the gross tuition reported by IPEDS.
The use of the model derived from this study and further research as suggested above will

provide stakeholders – including regional accrediting agencies, governing boards, and
administrators – insights into the future of these institutions. These insights may then be factored
into the holistic development of a go-forward strategy by the leadership teams at religiously
affiliated higher education institutions.
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Appendices
Appendix A - Private Faith-Based Higher Education Institutions on Heightened Cash Monitoring
as of June 1, 2016

Institution

City

State

Affiliation

Alaska Bible College

Palmer

AK

Nondenominational

University of Mobile

Mobile

AL

Baptist

Spring Hill College

Mobile

AL

Roman Catholic

Arkansas Baptist College

Little Rock

AR

Baptist

Ecclesia College

Springdale

AR

Nondenominational

San Diego Christian College

Santee

CA

Nondenominational

Hobe Sound Bible College

Hobe Sound

FL

Wesleyan

Emmanuel College

Franklin Springs (Franklin)

GA

Pentecostal

Iowa Wesleyan University

Mount Pleasant

IA

United Methodist

MacMurray College

Jacksonville

IL

United Methodist

Bethel College

Mishawaka

IN

Missionary Church

Bethany College

Lindsborg (McPherson)

KS

Evangelical Lutheran

Bethel College

North Newton (Harvey)

KS

Mennonite

Central Christian College

McPherson

KS

Free Methodist

MidAmerica Nazarene University

Olathe

KS

Church of the Nazarene

Kentucky Wesleyan College

Owensboro

KY

United Methodist

Boston Baptist College

Boston

MA

Baptist

Eastern Nazarene College

Quincy

MA

Church of the Nazarene

Maple Springs Baptist Bible College &
Seminary
Finlandia University

Capitol Heights (Prince
George's)
Hancock (Houghton)

MD

Baptist

MI

Evangelical Lutheran

Kuyper College

Grand Rapids

MI

Protestant

Rochester College (now University)

Rochester Hills

MI

Church of Christ

Evangel University

Springfield

MO

Assemblies of God

Central Christian College of The Bible

Moberly

MO

Church of Christ

William Peace University

Raleigh

NC

Presbyterian

Carolina Christian College

Winston-Salem

NC

Church of Christ

Unification Theological Seminary

Barrytown (Red Hook)

NY

Nondenominational

Yeshiva Shaarei Torah of Rockland

Suffern

NY

Jewish

Cincinnati Christian University

Cincinnati

OH

Church of Christ

Wilberforce University

Wilberforce (Greene)

OH

AME

St. Gregory’s University

Shawnee

OK

Roman Catholic
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New Hope Christian College

Eugene

OR

Protestant

Clarks Summit University

South Abington Township

PA

Baptist

University of Valley Forge

Phoenixville

PA

Assemblies of God

Allen University

Columbia

SC

AME

Bethel University

McKenzie

TN

Presbyterian

Williamson Christian College

Franklin

TN

Nondenominational

Hiwassee College

Madisonville

TN

United Methodist

Virginia Wesleyan College

Norfolk

VA

United Methodist

Green Mountain College

Poultney (Rutland)

VT

United Methodist

Faith International University

Tacoma

WA

Protestant

Saint Martin’s University

Lacey

WA

Roman Catholic

Ohio Valley University

Vienna

WV

Church of Christ

Note: Data for institutional closure from Busta, H. (2020, July 9). How many colleges and universities have closed
since 2016? Retrieved July 18, 2020, from https://www.educationdive.com/news/how-many-colleges-anduniversities-have-closed-since-2016/539379/ Data for FRR scores from Federal Student Aid. (2020a).
Retrieved February 18, 2020, from https://studentaid.gov/data-center/school/composite-scores
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Appendix B – Control Group of 100 Faith Based Institution not on Heightened Cash Monitoring
as of June 1, 2016
Institution

City

State

Affiliation

Huntingdon College

Montgomery

AL

Methodist

Judson College

Marion (Marion)

AL

Baptist

Stillman College

Tuscaloosa

AL

Presbyterian

Talladega College

Talladega

AL

United Church of Christ

Central Baptist College

Conway

AR

Baptist

John Brown University

Siloam Springs

AR

Nondenominational

Lyon College

Batesville

AR

Presbyterian

Ouachita Baptist
University
Philander Smith College

Arkadelphia

AR

Baptist

Little Rock

AR

United Methodist

Holy Names University

Oakland

CA

Roman Catholic

Loma Linda University

Loma Linda

CA

Seventh Day Adventist

Pepperdine University

Malibu

CA

Churches of Christ

Providence Christian
College
San Diego Christian
College
Vanguard University of
Southern California
Trinity College of Florida

Pasadena

CA

Nondenominational

Santee

CA

Nondenominational

Costa Mesa

CA

Assemblies of God

Trinity (Pasco)

FL

Nondenominational

Point University

West Point (Troup)

GA

Church of Christ

Shorter University

Rome

GA

Baptist

Wesleyan College

Macon (Macon)

GA

United Methodist

Brigham Young
University-Hawaii
Central College

Laie

HI

LDS

Pella

IA

Reformed Church

Graceland UniversityLamoni
Morningside College

Lamoni (Decatur)

IA

Evangelical Protestant

Sioux City

IA

United Methodist

Benedictine University

Lisle

IL

Roman Catholic

Judson University

Elgin

IL

Baptist

Lincoln Christian
University
Methodist College

Lincoln

IL

Church of Christ

Peoria

IL

Methodist

Millikin University

Decatur

IL

Presbyterian

Olivet Nazarene
University
Quincy University

Bourbonnais

IL

Church of the Nazarene

Quincy

IL

Roman Catholic

Telshe Yeshiva-Chicago

Chicago

IL

Jewish

Wheaton College

Wheaton

IL

Evangelical Protestant
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Huntington University

Huntington

IN

United Brethren

Manchester University

North Manchester

IN

Church of the Brethren

Saint Mary of the Woods
College
Baker University

IN

Roman Catholic

KS

Methodist

Ottawa University

Saint Mary of the
Woods (Vigo)
Baldwin City
(Douglas)
Ottawa

KS

American Baptist

Southwestern College

Winfield

KS

United Methodist

Sterling College

Sterling (Rice)

KS

Presbyterian

Sterling College

Sterling (Rice)

KS

Evangelical Nondenominational

Georgetown College

Georgetown

KY

Baptist

Thomas More College

Crestview Hills
(Kenton)
Chicopee

KY

Roman Catholic

MA

Roman Catholic

Baltimore

MD

Roman Catholic

Standish

ME

Roman Catholic

Grand Rapids

MI

Christian Reformed

Grand Rapids
Charter Township
Lansing

MI

Nondenominational

MI

Church of Christ

Duluth

MN

Roman Catholic

Fayetteville
(Johnson)

MO

Methodist

Kansas City

MO

Roman Catholic

Rockhurst University

Kansas City

MO

Roman Catholic

Saint Louis University

St Louis

MO

Roman Catholic

Webster University

Webster Groves

MO

Roman Catholic

Blue Mountain College

MS

Baptist

William Carey University

Blue Mountain
(Tippah)
Hattiesburg

MS

Baptist

Rocky Mountain College

Billings

MT

Church of Christ

Belmont Abbey
University
Carolina
University/Piedmont Int’l
Gardner-Webb
University
Greensboro College

Belmont

NC

Roman Catholic

Winston-Salem

NC

Baptist

Boiling Springs

NC

Baptist

Greensboro

NC

United Methodist

North Carolina Wesleyan
College
Pfeiffer University

Rocky Mount

NC

Methodist

Misenheimer
(Stanly)
Hastings

NC

United Methodist

NE

Presbyterian

College of Our Lady of
the Elms
Loyola University
Maryland
Saint Joseph's College of
Maine
Calvin University
Cornerstone University
Great Lakes Christian
College
The College of Saint
Scholastica
Central Methodist
University-College of
Liberal Arts and Sciences
Rockhurst University

Hastings College

77

Midland University

Fremont

NE

Lutheran

Northeast Catholic
College (now Magdalen)
Rivier University

Warner
(Merrimack)
Nashua

NH

Roman Catholic

NH

Roman Catholic

Centenary University

Hackettstown

NJ

United Methodist

College of Mount Saint
Vincent
Davis College

Bronx

NY

Roman Catholic

Johnson City

NY

Nondenominational

Fordham University

Bronx

NY

Roman Catholic

Bluffton University

Bluffton (Allen)

OH

Mennonite

Capital University

Columbus

OH

Lutheran

Defiance College

Defiance

OH

United Church of Christ

Muskingum University

New Concord
(Muskingum)
Cleveland

OH

Presbyterian

OH

Roman Catholic

Springfield

OH

Lutheran

Family of Faith Christian
University
Randall University

Shawnee

OK

Nondenominational

Moore

OK

Free Will Baptist

Southern Nazarene
University
Northwest Christian
University
DeSales University

Bethany

OK

Church of the Nazarene

Eugene

OR

Disciples of Christ

Center Valley
(Lehigh)
Elizabethtown

PA

Roman Catholic

PA

Church of the Brethren

PA

Jewish

La Salle University

Melrose Park
(Cheltenham
Township)
Philadelphia

PA

Roman Catholic

Mercyhurst University

Erie

PA

Roman Catholic

Benedict College

Columbia

SC

Baptist

Erskine College

SC

Reformed Presbyterian

Newberry College

Due West
(Abbeville)
Newberry

SC

Evangelical Lutheran

American Baptist College

Nashville

TN

Baptist

Baptist Memorial College
of Health Sciences
Carson – Newman
University
Messenger College

Memphis

TN

Baptist

Jefferson City

TN

Baptist

Bedford

TX

Protestant

Our Lady of the Lake
University
Southwestern Assemblies
of God University
Southwestern Christian
College

San Antonio

TX

Roman Catholic

Waxahachie

TX

Assemblies of God

Terrell

TX

Church of Christ

Notre Dame College of
Ohio
Wittenberg University

Elizabethtown College
Gratz College
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Averett University

Danville

VA

Baptist

Emory & Henry College

Emory
(Washington)
Philippi (Barbour)

VA

United Methodist

WV

American Baptist

Buckhannon

WV

United Methodist

Alderson Broaddus
University
West Virginia Wesleyan
College

Note: Data for FRR scores from: Federal Student Aid. (2020a). Retrieved February 18, 2020, from
https://studentaid.gov/data-center/school/composite-scores
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Appendix C – Institutions Closed or Announcing Closure – AY 2019 & 2020
Institution

City

State

Affiliation

Wesley College

Dover

DE

United Methodist

MacMurray College

Jacksonville

IL

United Methodist

Nebraska Christian
College
College of New Rochelle

Papillion

NE

Church of Christ

New Rochelle

NY

Roman Catholic

Cincinnati Christian
University
Urbana University

Cincinnati

OH

Church of Christ

Urbana

OH

Swedenborgian

Concordia University of
Portland
Hiwassee College

Portland

OR

Lutheran

Madisonville

TN

United Methodist

Martin Methodist College

Pulaski

TN

United Methodist

College of St. Joseph

Rutland

VT

Roman Catholic

Green Mountain College

Poultney (Rutland)

VT

United Methodist

Holy Family College

Manitowoc

WI

Roman Catholic

Note: Data for institutional closure from Busta, H. (2020, July 9). How many colleges and universities have closed
since 2016? Retrieved July 18, 2020, from https://www.educationdive.com/news/how-many-colleges-anduniversities-have-closed-since-2016/539379/ Data for FRR scores from Federal Student Aid. (2020a).
Retrieved February 18, 2020, from https://studentaid.gov/data-center/school/composite-scores
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Appendix D – Data Fields, Sources and Calculations
Data Field
Institution
City
State
Religious
Affiliation
Close Year
Population -5
Population -1
Population %
Chg.
Median Income
Poverty rate
Under 18 (2019)
White Pop %
BIPOCO

FT Enrollment 5
FT Enrollment 1
FT Enrollment
% Chg.
PT Enrollment 5
PT Enrollment 1
PT Enrollment
% Chg.
Women as % of
Enrollment - 5
Women as % of
Enrollment -1
Women % Chg.
FT/PT Student
ratio – 5
FT/PT Student
ratio – 1
FT/PT % Chg.
Distance Ed -5
% Distance Ed –
5
Distance Ed -1

Source
IPEDS
IPEDS
IPEDS
IPEDS

Description
Institution Name
Institution City
Institution State
Denominational Affiliation

Busta
US Census
Bureau
US Census
Bureau
Calculated

Year Institution Closed
City or Metropolitan Area Population in 2015 (or 2010 Census if 2015
estimate was unavailable)
City or Metropolitan Area Population in 2019 (or 2020 Census if 2019
estimate was unavailable)
Calculated Change from 2015 to 2019

US Census
Bureau
US Census
Bureau
US Census
Bureau
US Census
Bureau
Calculated

City or Metropolitan Area Median Income
City or Metropolitan Area Poverty Rate
City or Metropolitan Area Population under age 18
City or Metropolitan Area Population identifying as White

IPEDS

City or Metropolitan Area Population identifying as Black, Indigenous, or
other Persons of Color - Calculated by subtracting white percentage from
100%
Fall full-time Enrollment reported to IPEDS for Fall 2014

IPEDS

Fall full-time Enrollment reported to IPEDS for Fall 2019

Calculated

Calculated Change from 2014 to 2019

IPEDS

Fall part-time Enrollment reported to IPEDS for Fall 2014

IPEDS

Fall part-time Enrollment reported to IPEDS for Fall 2019

Calculated

Calculated Change from 2014 to 2019

IPEDS

Fall women enrollment reported to IPEDS in 2014

IPEDS

Fall women enrollment reported to IPEDS in 2019

Calculated
Calculated

Calculated Change from 2014 to 2019
Ratio of full time to part-time students as of Fall 2014 - Calculated by
dividing full-time students by part-time students
Ratio of full time to part-time students as of Fall 2019 - Calculated by
dividing full-time students by part-time students
Calculated Change from 2014 to 2019
Students reported as distance education only in Fall 2015
Distance education students as a percentage of full-time plus part-time
students in Fall 2014
Students reported as distance education only in Fall 2019

Calculated
Calculated
IPEDS
Calculated
IPEDS
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% Distance Ed 1
% Distance Ed
Chg.
FTFT Retention
-5
FTFT Retention
–1
FTFT % Chg.
% BIPOC - 5

Calculated
Calculated

Distance education students as a percentage of full-time plus part-time
students in Fall 2019
Calculated Change from 2014 to 2019

IPEDS

Full-time, first-time retention for Fall 2014

IPEDS

Full-time, first-time retention for Fall 2019

Calculated
IPEDS

Calculated Change from 2014 to 2019
Percentage of students identifying as BIPOC reported to IPEDS in Fall
2014
Percentage of students identifying as BIPOC reported to IPEDS in Fall
2019
Calculated Change from 2014 to 2019

% BIPOC - 1

IPEDS

% BIPOC - %
Chg.
No Applied -5
No Accepted -5
% Accepted -5

Calculated

Applicants
Attending - 5
% Accepted
Attending - 5
No Applied -1
No Accepted -1
% Accepted -1

IPEDS

Applicants
Attending - 1
% Accepted
Attending - 1
6-year grad rate
–5
6-year grad rate
–1
6-year grad rate
- % Chg.
% Pell Grant -5

IPEDS

% Pell Grant -1

IPEDS

Pell % Chg.
Tuition & Fees 5
Tuition & Fees 1
T&F % Chg.
Receiving
Institutional
Aid% -5
Amount Aid - 5

IPEDS
IPEDS
Calculated

IPEDS

Number of undergraduate applicants reported for the academic year 2015
Number of applicants accepted for the academic year 2015
Percentage of applicants that the institution accepted for the academic
year 2015
Number of applicants for the 2015 academic year that attended in Fall
2014
Percentage of 2014 applicants that were accepted and attended in Fall
2014
Number of undergraduate applicants reported for the academic year 2020
Number of applicants accepted for the academic year 2020
Percentage of applicants that the institution accepted for the academic
year 2020
Number of applicants for the 2020 academic year that attended in Fall
2019
Percentage of 2019 applicants that were accepted and attended in Fall
2019
The six-year graduation rate of students as measured in Fall 2014

IPEDS

The six-year graduation rate of students as measured in Fall 2019

IPEDS

Calculated Change from 2014 to 2019

IPEDS

IPEDS
IPEDS

Percentage of students receiving a Pell Grant in Fall 2014 - this is an
indicator of student financial need and economic means
Percentage of students receiving a Pell Grant in Fall 2019 - this is an
indicator of student financial need and economic means
Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020
Stated full-time tuition and mandatory fees for Academic Year 2015

IPEDS

Stated full-time tuition and mandatory fees for Academic Year 2020

Calculated
IPEDS

Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020
Percentage of undergraduate students receiving institutional aid or
discounts for Academic Year 2015

IPEDS

The average amount of institutional aid or discounts for Academic Year
2015

Calculated
IPEDS
IPEDS
Calculated

Calculated
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T&F Discount 5
Receiving
Institutional
Aid% -1
Amount Aid - 1

Calculated

T&F Discount 1
T&F Discount
Chg.%
FT Staff -5
FT Staff -1
FT Staff - %
Chg.
FT Instructor -5
FT Instructor -1
FT Instructor % Chg.
PT Instructor -5
PT Instructor -1
PT Instructor % Chg.
FT Inst % -5

Calculated

FT Inst % -1

Calculated

FT/PT Inst %
Chg.
FT Staff/Student
-5
FT Staff/Student
%-1
FT Staff/Student
% - % Chg.
FT Inst/Student
% -5
FT Inst/Student
% -1
FT Inst/Student
% -% Chg.
Endowment -5
Endowment -1
Endowment %
Chg.
Endowment/FT
E -5
Endowment/FT
E -1
E/FT % Chg.
Tuition & Fees
per FTE -5

Calculated

IPEDS

IPEDS

The calculated percentage of discount as calculated by dividing Amount
Aid by Tuition & Fees
Percentage of undergraduate students receiving institutional aid or
discounts for Academic Year 2020

Calculated

The average amount of institutional aid or discounts for Academic Year
2020
The calculated percentage of discount as calculated by dividing Amount
Aid by Tuition & Fees
Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020

IPEDS
IPEDS
Calculated

Number of full-time staff as reported in Fall 2014
Number of full-time staff as reported in Fall 2019
Calculated Change from 2014 to 2019

IPEDS
IPEDS
Calculated

Number of full-time instructors as reported in Fall 2014
Number of full-time instructors as reported in Fall 2019
Calculated Change from 2014 to 2019

IPEDS
IPEDS
Calculated

Number of part-time instructors as reported in Fall 2014
Number of part-time instructors as reported in Fall 2020
Calculated Change from 2014 to 2019

Calculated

Calculated percentage of full-time instructors as a percentage of all
instructors in Fall 2014
Calculated percentage of full-time instructors as a percentage of all
instructors in Fall 2019
Calculated Change from 2014 to 2019

Calculated
IPEDS
Calculated
IPEDS

The ratio of full-time students to staff as calculated by dividing the FTE
student count by FT Staff in Fall 2014
The ratio of full-time students to staff as calculated by dividing the FTE
student count by FT Staff in Fall 2020
Calculated Change from 2014 to 2019

Calculated

The ratio of full-time students to full-time instructors as calculated by
dividing the FTE student count by FT Staff in Fall 2014
The ratio of full-time students to full-time instructors as calculated by
dividing the FTE student count by FT Staff in Fall 2019
Calculated Change from 2014 to 2019

IPEDS
IPEDS
Calculated

Reported restricted net assets in IPEDS for Academic Year 2015
Reported restricted net assets in IPEDS for Academic Year 2020
Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020

Calculated

Calculated dollars of Endowment divided by the number of FTE students
to get endowment per FTE student in Academic Year 2015
Calculated dollars of Endowment divided by the number of FTE students
to get endowment per FTE student in Academic Year 2020
Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020
Total tuition and fees revenue per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for
AY 2015

IPEDS

Calculated
Calculated
IPEDS

83

Tuition & Fees
per FTE -1
T&F % Chg.
GGC -5

IPEDS

GGC - 1

IPEDS

GGC % Chg.
PGGC - 5

Calculated
IPEDS

PGGC -1

IPEDS

PGGC % Chg.
Investment -5
Investment -1
Investment %
Chg.
Other Core -5
Other Core -1
Other Core %
Chg.
Tuition% of
Core -5

Calculated
IPEDS
IPEDS
Calculated

Total tuition and fees revenue per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for
AY 2020
Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020
Government Grants and Contracts per FTE student as reported to IPEDS
for AY 2015
Government Grants and Contracts per FTE student as reported to IPEDS
for AY 2020
Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020
Private Gifts, Grants, and Contracts per FTE student as reported to
IPDES for AY 2015
Private Gifts, Grants, and Contracts per FTE student as reported to
IPDES for AY 2020
Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020
Investment returns per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY 2015
Investment returns per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY 2020
Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020

IPEDS
IPEDS
Calculated

Other Core Revenues per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY 2015
Other Core Revenues per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY 2020
Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020

Calculated

Tuition% of
Core -1

Calculated

Tuition % of
Core % Chg.
Instruction -5

Calculated

Measuring tuition reliance - calculated by measuring tuition as a
percentage of total core revenue (Tuition & Fees, GGC, PGGC,
Investment, Other Core) for AY 2015
Measuring tuition reliance - calculated by measuring tuition as a
percentage of total core revenue (Tuition & Fees, GGC, PGGC,
Investment, Other Core) for AY 2020
Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020

IPEDS

Instruction expense per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY 2015

Instruction -1
Instruction %
Chg.
Research -5
Research -1
Research %
Chg.
PS -5

IPEDS
Calculated

Instruction expense per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY 2020
Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020

IPEDS
IPEDS
Calculated

Research expense per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY 2015
Research expense per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY 2020
Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020

IPEDS

PS-1

IPEDS

PS% Chg.
AS -5

Calculated
IPEDS

AS -1

IPEDS

AS% Chg.
SS - 5

Calculated
IPEDS

SS -1

IPEDS

Public Service expense per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY
2015
Public Service expense per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY
2020
Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020
Academic Support expense per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY
2015
Academic Support expense per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY
2020
Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020
Student Services expense per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY
2015
Student Services expense per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY
2020

Calculated
IPEDS
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SS % Chg.
IS -5

Calculated
IPEDS

IS -1

IPEDS

IS % Chg.
Other Core -5
Other Core -1
Other Core %
Chg.
Instruction %
Exp -5
Instruction %
Exp -1
Instruction %
Exp -% Chg.
Total Revenues
-5
Total Expenses
-5
Surplus/Deficit
-5
FTE -5
Total Revenues
-1
Total Expenses
-1
Surplus/Deficit
-1
FTE -1
TR % Chg.

Calculated
IPEDS
IPEDS
Calculated

Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020
Institutional Support expense per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for
AY 2015
Institutional Support expense per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for
AY 2020
Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020
Other Core expenses per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY 2015
Other Core expenses per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY 2020
Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020

Calculated

Percentage of total expenses spent on Instruction expense in AY 2015

Calculated

Percentage of total expenses spent on Instruction expense in AY 2020

Calculated

Calculated Change from AY 2015 to AY 2020

IPEDS

Total Revenue per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY 2015

IPEDS

Total Expenses per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY 2015

Calculated
IPEDS
IPEDS

Excess or deficit per FTE student as calculated by subtracting Total
Expenses from Total Revenues for AY 2015
Total FTE equivalent students as reported to IPEDS for Fall 2014
Total Revenue per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY 2020

IPEDS

Total Expenses per FTE student as reported to IPEDS for AY 2020

Calculated

TE % Chg.

Calculated

S/D % Chg.

Calculated

FTE % Chg.
FRR -2016

Calculated
Financial
Responsibility
Composite
Scores
Financial
Responsibility
Composite
Scores
Calculated
Heightened Cash
Monitoring

Excess or deficit per FTE student as calculated by subtracting Total
Expenses from Total Revenues for AY 2020
Total FTE equivalent students as reported to IPEDS for Fall 2019
Calculated Change in Total Revenue per FTE student from AY 2015 to
AY 2020
Calculated Change in Total Expenses per FTE student from AY 2015 to
AY 2020
Calculated Change in Surplus or Deficit per FTE student from AY 2015
to AY 2020
Calculated Change in FTE student count from Fall 2014 to Fall 2019
FRR score for the institution as reported by the United States Department
of Education in June 2016

FRR -2019

FRR % Chg.
2016 HCM

IPEDS
Calculated

FRR score for the institution as reported by the United States Department
of Education in June 2019

Percentage change in FRR score between 2016 and 2019
Whether the institution was on Heightened Cash Monitoring list in June
2016
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Appendix E – Descriptive Statistical Data – Closed Institutions
Appendix D contains the data definitions, sources, and any transformation calculations.
N=12
Data Field
Population -5
Population -1
Population % Chg.
Median Income
Poverty rate
Under 18 (2019)
White Pop %
BIPOCO
FT Enrollment -5
FT Enrollment -1
FT Enrollment % Chg.
PT Enrollment -5
PT Enrollment -1
PT Enrollment % Chg.
Women as % of Enrollment - 5
Women as % of Enrollment -1
Women % Chg.
FT/PT Student ratio - 5
FT/PT Student ratio - 1
FT/PT % Chg.
Distance Ed -5
% Distance Ed - 5
Distance Ed -1
% Distance Ed -1
% Distance Ed Chg.
FTFT Retention -5
FTFT Retention - 1
FTFT % Chg.
% BIPOC - 5
% BIPOC - 1
% BIPOC - % Chg.
No Applied -5
No Accepted -5
% Accepted -5
Applicants Attending - 5
% Accepted Attending - 5

Mean
97,465.58
103,693.75
6.39%
50,868.25
16.87%
20.54%
78.38%
21.62%
766.58
652
-14.95%
210.58
90.08
-57.22%
58.42%
58.08%
-0.57%
3.64
7.24
98.82%
15
1.54%
20.67
2.78%
81.42%
65.33%
59.25%
-9.31%
36.5%
42.92%

Standard Deviation
172,808.28
191,955.76
6.00%
16,986.36
6.62%
2.57%
18.2%
18.20%
719.81
556.96
18.51%
297.95
102.34
46.63%
11.96%
14.28%
17.9%
9.45
18.32
603.64%
22.41
2.16%
46.53
3.48%
100.84%
11.20%
12.32%
35.43%
22.12%
16.48%

Max
583,793
654,741
12.115%
80,918
27.2%
25.0%
96.4%
55.70%
2,666
2,003
14.23%
1,085
302
50%
89%
83%
43.48%
34.81
57.20
1,978.52%
79
6.28%
164
10.93%
172.24%
81.00%
85.00%
93.18%
94.00%
88.00%

Min
4,737
5,002
-8.47%
29,722
4.1%
16.7%
44.3%
3.6%
121
124
-39.61%
15
9
-95.11%
45%
35%
-27.08%
.58
2.26
-39.39%
0
0%
0
0%
-100%
44.00%
45.00%
10.00%
10.00%
27.00%

17.58%
1,300
689.11
53.01%
178.89
25.96%

87.98%
1,208.96
602.96
12.45%
147.15
15.98%

300.00%
3,231
1,832
78.37%
431
68.79%

-21.95%
241
141
38.53%
45
14.69%
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No Applied -1
No Accepted -1
% Accepted -1
Applicants Attending - 1
% Accepted Attending - 1
6-year grad rate - 5
6-year grad rate - 1
6-year grad rate - % Chg.
% Pell Grant -5
% Pell Grant -1
Pell % Chg.
Tuition & Fees -5
Tuition & Fees -1
T&F % Chg.
Receiving Institutional Aid% -5
Amount Aid - 5
T&F Discount -5
Receiving Institutional Aid% -1
Amount Aid - 1
T&F Discount -1
T&F Discount Chg.%
FT Staff -5
FT Staff -1
FT Staff - % Chg.
FT Instructor -5
FT Instructor -1
FT Instructor - % Chg.
PT Instructor -5
PT Instructor -1
PT Instructor - % Chg.
FT Inst % -5
FT Inst % -1
FT/PT Inst % Chg.
FT Staff/Student - 5
FT Staff/Student % - 1
FT Staff/Student % - % Chg.
FT Inst/Student % -5
FT Inst/Student % -1
FT Inst/Student % -% Chg.
Endowment -5
Endowment -1
Endowment % Chg.
Endowment/FTE -5

1,602.25
692.83
65.22%
162.92
23.51%
35.36%
39.67%
12.17%
55.67%
58.83%
5.69%
22,090.67
25,382.03
14.90%
93.25%
9,742.42
41.13%
95.00%
14,193.25
53.12%
29.17%
131.25
122.08
-6.98%
43.58
37.00
-15.11%
106.00
73.83
-30.35%
29.14%

834.23
539.89
21.23%
106.01
20.67%
10.84%
9.37%
36.63%
15.20%
13.02%
24.50%
6,465.94
6,953.61
11.48%
9.17%
4,835.09
14.14%
9.19%
6,244.94
11.24%
59.91%
106.30
98.18
16.46%
29.85
26.40
24.16%
176.51
83.50
37.68%
28.74%

2,960
1,830
99.61%
321
76.27%
55.00%
54.00%
92.86%
87.00%
84.00%
58.49%
32,192.00
37,252.00
48.94%
100.00%
19,781.00
59.60%
100.00%
25,107.00
67.40%
192.65%
349
359
29.53%
97.00
86.00
22.86%
586.00
289.00
28.13%
100.00%

161
54
33.54%
25
12.14%
21.00%
25.00%
-30.56%
39.00%
41.00%
-26.58%
11,300.00
16,469.00
4.11%
67.00%
3,451.00
15.44%
68.00%
5,309.00
30.62%
-13.11%
22
21
-29.03%
6.00
6.00
-52.38%
0
0
-100.00%
11.48%

33.38%
14.58%
11.21
9.28
-17.18%
33.76
30.63
-9.26%
8,200,899.25
8,339,643.50
-1.90%
5,778.01

23.69%
59.45%
4.73
2.95
45.78%
23.14
19.23
53.89%
5,150,348.94
6,974,420.09
39.75%
9,931.48

100.00%
133.52%
21.36
13.58
138.31%
98.09
77.38
145.54%
17,077,901.00
20,245,921.00
18.55%
31,743.31

15.27%
-84.73%
3.39
4.82
-36.43%
10.18
13.80
-27.83%
1,352,977.00
0.00
-100.00%
1,956.40
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Endowment/FTE -1
E/FT % Chg.
Tuition & Fees per FTE -5
Tuition & Fees per FTE -1
T&F % Chg.
GGC -5
GGC - 1
GGC % Chg.
PGGC - 5
PGGC -1
PGGC % Chg.
Investment -5
Investment -1
Investment % Chg.
Other Core -5
Other Core -1
Other Core % Chg.
Tuition% of Core -5
Tuition% of Core -1
Tuition % of Core % Chg.
Instruction -5
Instruction -1
Instruction % Chg.
Research -5
Research -1
Research % Chg.
PS -5
PS-1
PS% Chg.
AS -5
AS -1

7,358.51
27.35%
12,010.67
11,602.42
-3.40%
533.00
982.67
84.37%
3,997.17
5,240.25
31.10%
1,381.58
649.00
-53.02%
1,229.08
558.83
-54.53%
62.71%
60.96%
-2.80%
6,251.17
6,809.92
8.94%
41.75
85.92
105.79%
183.83
40.92
-77.74%
1,646.50
1,607.67

11,808.49
51.55%
4,111.09
3,644.73
36.11%
747.65
1,312.06
237.23%
4,160.65
6,773.74
395.18%
2,434.80
766.27
134.52%
1,465.05
577.20
56.13%
15.03%
19.75%
23.86%
2,562.60
2,818.25
33.48%
144.63
297.62
N/A
636.82
141.74
N/A
1,391.61
1,295.38

38,869.73
80.44%
22,666.00
17,034.00
80.40%
2,479.00
3,661.00
445.95%
13,826.00
20,681.00
1,332.35%
8,863.00
2,554.00
377.92%
4,596.00
1,968.00
75.20%
85.12%
86.30%
38.61%
12,504.00
12,227.00
58.52%
501.00
1,031.00
105.79%
2,206.00
491.00
-77.74%
4,174.00
4,142.00

0.00
-100.00%
7,997.00
5,014.00
-57.15%
0.00
0.00
-100.00%
68.00
342.00
-94.62%
10.00
0.00
-100.00%
0.00
0.00
-100.00%
45.42%
23.25%
-49.50%
2,545.00
2,376.00
-58.03%
0.00
0.00
105.79%
0.00
0.00
-77.74%
339.00
238.00

AS% Chg.
SS - 5
SS -1
SS % Chg.
IS -5
IS -1
IS % Chg.
Other Core -5
Other Core -1
Other Core % Chg.
Instruction % Exp -5
Instruction % Exp -1

-2.36%
4,445.67
5,602.00
26.01%
4,902.33
5,517.92
12.56%
1,287.67
860.08
-33.21%
28.06%
28.91%

42.15%
2,635.28
1,937.26
69.63%
2,588.72
2,754.71
81.57%
1,704.92
1,671.51
37.19%
6.82%
6.34%

105.88%
11,274.00
9,767.00
231.99%
9,427.00
12,655.00
264.72%
4,533.00
5,381.00
-14.91%
40.36%
37.56%

-38.33%
2,117.00
3,314.00
-52.94%
1,490.00
2,071.00
-50.93%
0.00
0.00
-100.00%
15.83%
19.01%
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Instruction % Exp -% Chg.
Total Revenues - 5
Total Expenses -5
Surplus/Deficit -5
FTE -5
Total Revenues - 1
Total Expenses -1
Surplus/Deficit -1
FTE -1
TR % Chg.
TE % Chg.
S/D % Chg.
FTE % Chg.
FRR -2013
FRR -2019
FRR % Chg.

3.05%
23,351.67
22,278.25
1,073.42
1,471.25
23,067.17
23,552.00
-484.83
1,133.33
-1.22%
5.72%
-145.17%
-22.97%
1.65
1.27
-23.24%

12.01%
11,202.59
8,105.26
3,664.57
2,070.82
8,578.07
6,957.35
4,598.71
1,366.01
41.52%
36.52%
692.85%
49.15%
0.53
1.23
66.64%
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23.56%
56,505.00
45,541.00
10,964.00
7,455.00
38,426.00
38,059.00
12,280.00
4,875.00
92.35%
99.14%
80.12%
145.54%
2.50
3.00
85.71%

-20.39%
14,198.00
16,082.00
-3,756.00
112.00
7,516.00
11,543.00
-5,565.00
135.00
-63.05%
-51.42%
-2,412.62%
-36.50%
0.60
-0.90
-150.00%

Appendix F – Descriptive Statistical Data – Heightened Cash Monitoring Institutions
Appendix D contains the data definitions, sources, and any transformation calculations.
N=43
Data Field
Population -5
Population -1
Population % Chg.
Median Income
Poverty rate
Under 18 (2019)
White Pop %
BIPOCO
FT Enrollment -5
FT Enrollment -1
FT Enrollment % Chg.
PT Enrollment -5
PT Enrollment -1
PT Enrollment % Chg.
Women as % of Enrollment - 5
Women as % of Enrollment -1
Women % Chg.
FT/PT Student ratio - 5
FT/PT Student ratio - 1
FT/PT % Chg.
Distance Ed -5
% Distance Ed - 5
Distance Ed -1
% Distance Ed -1
% Distance Ed Chg.
FTFT Retention -5
FTFT Retention - 1
FTFT % Chg.
% BIPOC - 5
% BIPOC - 1
% BIPOC - % Chg.
No Applied -5
No Accepted -5
% Accepted -5
Applicants Attending - 5
% Accepted Attending - 5

Mean
121,152.47
129,144.95
6.60%
56,457.42
15.24%
21.29%
75.34%
24.66%
628.17
566.86
-9.76%
129.86
124.19
-4.36%
50.43%
49.76%
-1.32%
4.84
4.56
-5.64%
98
12.90%
87.40
12.65%
-1.93%
66.21%
64.35%
-2.82%
42.12%
45.19%

Standard Deviation
166,969.03
180,356.98
8.25%
17,356.08
6.04%
3.30%
17.46%
17.46%
610.32
544.90
32.91%
217.29
252.10
128.00%
12.23%
11.98%
15.25%
12.24
18.95
3.49%
344.62
15.28%
267.75
14.37%
121.13%
16.59%
16.88%
42.91%
26.08%
24.18%

Max
863,420.00
909,327.00
32.81%
94,808.00
27.20%
31.00%
97.00%
72.90%
3,445.00
2,981.00
80.56%
1,347.00
1,579.00
475.00%
69.00%
70.00%
48.94%
61.59
95.46
197.90%
2,195.00
66.53%
1,734.00
61.82%
376.71%
100.00%
100.00%
203.03%
100.00%
100.00%

Min
4,737
5,002
-6.49%
29,722.00
4.00%
15.00%
27.10%
3.00%
3.00
0
-100.00%
0.00
0.00
-100.00%
0.00%
0.00%
-27.08%
0.05
0.04
-88.55%
0.00
0.00%
0.00
0.00%
-100.00%
33.00%
0.00%
-100.00%
0.00%
6.00%

7.29%
972.35
571.56
58.78%
164.82
28.84%

32.32%
1,066.86
592.89
17.53%
124.59
22.26%

122.22%
6,245.00
3,233.00
100.00%
636.00
90.32%

-43.14%
14.00
14.00
32.35%
7.00
6.64%
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No Applied -1
No Accepted -1
% Accepted -1
Applicants Attending - 1
% Accepted Attending - 1
6-year grad rate - 5
6-year grad rate - 1
6-year grad rate - % Chg.
% Pell Grant -5
% Pell Grant -1
Pell % Chg.
Tuition & Fees -5
Tuition & Fees -1
T&F % Chg.
Receiving Institutional Aid% -5
Amount Aid - 5
T&F Discount -5
Receiving Institutional Aid% -1
Amount Aid - 1
T&F Discount -1
T&F Discount Chg.%
FT Staff -5
FT Staff -1
FT Staff - % Chg.
FT Instructor -5
FT Instructor -1
FT Instructor - % Chg.
PT Instructor -5
PT Instructor -1
PT Instructor - % Chg.
FT Inst % -5
FT Inst % -1
FT/PT Inst % Chg.
FT Staff/Student - 5
FT Staff/Student % - 1
FT Staff/Student % - % Chg.
FT Inst/Student % -5
FT Inst/Student % -1
FT Inst/Student % -% Chg.
Endowment -5
Endowment -1
Endowment % Chg.
Endowment/FTE -5

1,397.39
877.32
62.78%
180.19
20.54%
41.89%
43.65%
4.20%
53.66%
52.42%
-2.31%
18,275.14
20,589.07
12.66%
82.49%
8,718.29
39.35%
84.61%
11,108.50
45.65%
16.00%
116.31
106.74
-8.23%
37.26
34.95
-6.20%
56.81
50.21
-11.61%
39.61%

1,594.34
1,053.02
17.01%
108.04
18.01%
16.96%
20.59%
57.09%
19.31%
16.54%
24.04%
7,378.09
8,767.61
16.89%
26.95%
5,791.05
20.36%
22.50%
6,579.16
18.16%
118.68%
109.60
96.27
22.36%
35.40
35.00
31.36%
63.41
47.15
60.96%
24.53%

8,587.00
5,648.00
100.00%
412.00
76.27%
100.00%
100.00%
233.33%
100.00%
90.00%
38.24%
32,482.00
37,584.00
98.76%
100.00%
21,596.00
69.27%
100.00%
29,411.00
78.25%
671.30%
586
488
70.00%
185.00
183.00
125.00%
313.00
235.00
300.00%
100.00%

22.00
17.00
32.03%
8.00
5.47%
3.00%
0.00%
-37.93%
0.00%
18.00%
-73.33%
4,025.00
5,645.00
-15.24%
0.00%
0.00
0.00%
12.00%
886.00
1.47%
-68.53%
7
5
-62.16%
1.00
1.00
-68.97%
0.00
0.00
-100.00%
5.26%

41.04%
3.61%
7.05
6.37
-9.75%
22.02
19.44
-11.70%
11,219,427.45
12,360,805,76
10.17%
13,673.89

22.11%
56.34%
2.39
2.31
36.37%
11.30
15.19
46.86%
13,528,374.43
14,515,882.49
49.91%
15,601.84

100.00%
266.67%
12.50
13.00
88.03%
69.00
83.00
180.65%
56,802,477.00
64,923,447.00
211.29%
55,420.98

3.70%
-70.00%
1.92
0.00
-100.00%
3.13
2.33
-48.77%
0.00
0.00
-100.00%
0.00
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Endowment/FTE -1
E/FT % Chg.
Tuition & Fees per FTE -5
Tuition & Fees per FTE -1
T&F % Chg.
GGC -5
GGC - 1
GGC % Chg.
PGGC - 5
PGGC -1
PGGC % Chg.
Investment -5
Investment -1
Investment % Chg.
Other Core -5
Other Core -1
Other Core % Chg.
Tuition% of Core -5
Tuition% of Core -1
Tuition % of Core % Chg.
Instruction -5
Instruction -1
Instruction % Chg.
Research -5
Research -1
Research % Chg.
PS -5
PS-1
PS% Chg.
AS -5
AS -1

18,189.12
33.02%
10,704.40
10,835.79
1.23%
797.79
1,171.83
46.89%
4,300.50
4,480.52
4.23%
864.29
741.55
-14.20%
1,505.69
1,252.74
-16.80%
58.90%
58.62%
0.48%
6,398.05
6,353.05
-0.70%
28.19
41.12
45.86%
298.29
184.24
-38.23%
1,708.33
1,707.24

17,699.37
58.04%
3,325.41
3,986.92
34.23%
1,257.15
2,748.80
241.88%
3,909.42
4,692.45
115.35%
1,092.26
1,132.67
81.22%
3,573.46
2,793.79
252.11%
17.07%
20.44%
37.60%
2,525.87
2,766.76
47.08%
155.81
169.14
305.71%
857.80
392.83
285.89%
1,729.69
1,545.86

60,712.70
232.76%
18,695.00
19,997.00
103.61%
4,438.00
16,363.00
1,123.53%
16,025.00
23,822.00
466.92%
5,218.00
5,080.00
500.67%
18,156.00
14,365.00
857.03%
95.63%
97.86%
123.16%
14,223.00
14,559.00
204.77%
581.00
1,031.00
708.69%
4,691.00
1,167.00
1,100.00%
8,933.00
8,466.00

0.00
-100.00%
3,424.00
1,771.00
-73.48%
0.00
0.00
-100.00%
160.00
423.00
-90.69%
0.00
-1,358.00
-377.63%
0.00
0.00
-100.00%
22.12%
9.00%
-77.63%
2,234.00
1,414.00
-71.18%
0.00
0.00
-100.00%
0.00
0.00
-86.27%
0.00
0.00

AS% Chg.
SS - 5
SS -1
SS % Chg.
IS -5
IS -1
IS % Chg.
Other Core -5
Other Core -1
Other Core % Chg.
Instruction % Exp -5
Instruction % Exp -1

-0.06%
3,707.05
4,154.74
12.08%
5,097.60
6,506.43
27.64%
1,515.29
1,567.55
3.45%
28.62%
26.89%

66.45%
2,196.82
2,511.37
65.46%
3,246.79
3,940.89
131.01%
2,817.74
2,362.62
145.76%
9.19%
9.89%

239.13%
7,766.00
9,886.00
202.19%
15,881.00
23,333.00
682.17%
13,909.00
11,584.00
556.07%
59.21%
51.02%

-78.96%
0.00
46.00
-97.18%
819.00
525.00
-61.54%
0.00
0.00
-100.00%
11.71%
11.11%
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Instruction % Exp -% Chg.
Total Revenues - 5
Total Expenses -5
Surplus/Deficit -5
FTE -5
Total Revenues - 1
Total Expenses -1
Surplus/Deficit -1
FTE -1
TR % Chg.
TE % Chg.
S/D % Chg.
FTE % Chg.
FRR -2013
FRR -2019
FRR % Chg.

-6.04%
22,046.71
22,356.26
-310.19
820.50
23,404.43
23,625.09
-220.67
679.57
6.16%
5.68%
-28.86%
-17.18%
1.10
1.41
.2818

31.62%
8,180.48
8,150.98
3,578.98
1,023.65
7,890.01
7,478.45
3,470.31
642.78
32.64%
25.32%
470.58%
21.99%
.81
1.06
1.18
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135.79%
46,516.00
53,970.00
12,458.00
6,407.00
47,368.00
48,073.00
11,385.00
3,381.00
121.32%
94.72%
1,607.55%
41.03%
3.00
3.00
2.43

-64.94%
8,512.00
8,422.00
-7,454.00
24.00
7,441.00
6,959.00
-6,966.00
14.00
-46.05%
-49.70%
-876.15%
-50.00%
-1.00
-1.00
-3.33

Appendix G – Descriptive Statistical Data – Random Control Institutions
Appendix D contains the data definitions, sources, and any transformation calculations.
N=100
Data Field
Population -5
Population -1
Population % Chg.
Median Income
Poverty rate
Under 18 (2019)
White Pop %
BIPOCO
FT Enrollment -5
FT Enrollment -1
FT Enrollment % Chg.
PT Enrollment -5
PT Enrollment -1
PT Enrollment % Chg.
Women as % of Enrollment - 5
Women as % of Enrollment -1
Women % Chg.
FT/PT Student ratio - 5
FT/PT Student ratio - 1
FT/PT % Chg.
Distance Ed -5
% Distance Ed - 5
Distance Ed -1
% Distance Ed -1
% Distance Ed Chg.
FTFT Retention -5
FTFT Retention - 1
FTFT % Chg.
% BIPOC - 5
% BIPOC - 1
% BIPOC - % Chg.
No Applied -5
No Accepted -5
% Accepted -5
Applicants Attending - 5
% Accepted Attending - 5

Mean
186,700.09
194,942.48
2.47%
53,436.44
17.09%
21.82%
72.08%
27.92%
1,330.97
1,267.01
-4.81%
280.02
246.31
-12.04%
57.17%
57.03%
-0.25%
4.75
5.14
8.22%
94.16
5.84%
92.71
8.33%
42.60%
71.07%
69.95%
-2.00%
37.62%
40.30%

Standard Deviation
392,211.21
406,718.98
7.44%
18,260.61
6.67%
2.73%
19.72%
19.72%
1,243.54
1,251.18
0.61%
562.49
401.98
117.24%
13.88%
13.38%
15.28%
16.78
21.48
90.87%
173.41
15.17%
137.53
12.66%
216.69%
11.86%
12.57%
12.57%
22.10%
21.67%

Max
2,695,652
2,693,976
28.61%
147,934
34.60%
28.40%
96.90%
70.90%
8,058
9,149
13.54%
5,238
3,342
655.56%
97.00%
99.00%
131.82%
82.35
108.17
408.63%
860
100.00%
723
70.00%
994.07%
100.00%
100.00%
55.56%
99.00%
100.00%

Min
5,370
5,394
-12.18%
28,668
4.10%
14.00%
29.10%
3.10%
0
5
-73.68%
0
0
-91.54%
0.00%
0.00%
-25.35%
0
0.33
-91.23%
0
0.00%
0
0.00%
-100.00%
29.00%
33.00%
-39.71%
0.00%
1.00%

7.13%
2,599.08
1,605.36
61.77%
349.64
21.78%

22.49%
4,769.83
2,435.32
15.62%
329.35
17.42%

100.00%
40,912
19,685
100.00%
2,258
100.00%

-47.83%
18
8
33.43%
4
9.97%
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No Applied -1
No Accepted -1
% Accepted -1
Applicants Attending - 1
% Accepted Attending - 1
6-year grad rate – 5
6-year grad rate - 1
6-year grad rate - % Chg.
% Pell Grant -5
% Pell Grant -1
Pell % Chg.
Tuition & Fees -5
Tuition & Fees -1
T&F % Chg.
Receiving Institutional Aid% -5
Amount Aid - 5
T&F Discount -5
Receiving Institutional Aid% -1
Amount Aid - 1
T&F Discount -1
T&F Discount Chg.%
FT Staff -5
FT Staff -1
FT Staff - % Chg.
FT Instructor -5
FT Instructor -1
FT Instructor - % Chg.
PT Instructor -5
PT Instructor -1
PT Instructor - % Chg.
FT Inst % -5
FT Inst % -1
FT/PT Inst % Chg.
FT Staff/Student – 5
FT Staff/Student - 1
FT Staff/Student % - % Chg.
FT Inst/Student % -5
FT Inst/Student % -1
FT Inst/Student % -% Chg.
Endowment -5
Endowment -1
Endowment % Chg.
Endowment/FTE -5

2,940.27
1,751.91
60.32%
339.37
19.37%
51.38%
50.79%
-1.15%
44.08%
46.39%
5.25%
24,096.34
27,062.93
12.31%
91.12%
12,901.93
48.79%
90.72%
15,152.29
50.80%
4.11%
325.88
325.91
0.01%
104.83
103.16
-1.59%
118.93
115.06
-3.25%
46.85%

5,193.94
2,571.86
16.32%
320.22
17.10%
15.21%
16.66%
26.48%
15.92%
18.34%
23.82%
8,233.97
9,640.21
8.86%
16.58%
5,844.09
15.52%
20.57%
7,028.48
16.94%
24.94%
503.31
536.39
16.27%
165.27
157.96
20.17%
189.57
156.24
1,000.67%
22.26%

46,308
21,313
100.00%
2,299
100.00%
100.00%
87.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
85.19%
44,902.00
51,992.00
32.91%
100.00%
30,985.00
78.38%
100.00%
27,873.00
82.62%
93.31%
4,127
4,600
57.89%
1,394
1,315
133.33%
1,425
1,040
9,700.00%
100.00%

4
1
25.00%
0
0.00%
10.00%
0.00%
-100.00%
0.00%
0.00%
-100.00%
4,770.00
5,400.00
-32.13%
0.00%
0.00
0.00%
0.00%
0.00
0.00%
-93.57%
7
6
-58.49%
1
1
-38.46%
0
0
-100.00%
10.00%

47.27%
0.28%
6.37
6.09
-4.43%
19.81
19.24
-2.87%
54,386,608.81
61,869,991.52
13.76%
26,186.32

19.80%
24.05%
3.88
2.15
28.50%
21.11
12.34
35.72%
101,011,802.87
117,484,677.95
535.33%
27,723.65

100.00%
69.48%
36.96
14.21
122.22%
184.80
98.16
231.58%
602,601,967
666,930,000
52.38%
141,060.70

6.67%
-61.06%
2.71
2.57
-87.26%
8.13
8.99
-66.04%
0
0
-78.63%
0.00
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Endowment/FTE -1
E/FT % Chg.
Tuition & Fees per FTE -5
Tuition & Fees per FTE -1
T&F % Chg.
GGC -5
GGC - 1
GGC % Chg.
PGGC - 5
PGGC -1
PGGC % Chg.
Investment -5
Investment -1
Investment % Chg.
Other Core -5
Other Core -1
Other Core % Chg.
Tuition% of Core -5
Tuition% of Core -1
Tuition % of Core % Chg.
Instruction -5
Instruction -1
Instruction % Chg.
Research -5
Research -1
Research % Chg.
PS -5
PS-1
PS% Chg.
AS -5
AS -1

28,735.18
9.73%
12,505.98
13,079.48
4.59%
999.95
1,227.07
22.71%
4,257.96
4,797.82
12.68%
3,467.29
2,200.35
-36.54%
1,527.13
1,200.78
-21.37%
54.95%
58.12%
5.76%
7,881.60
8,306.99
5.40%
140.25
138.01
-1.60%
246.52
259.30
5.18%
1,912.48
2,163.13

29,597.61
460.90%
4,769.31
5,093.52
62.85%
1,798.85
3,457.73
139.35%
4,966.08
5,652.53
165.83%
4,438.52
2,945.32
340.37%
3,571.55
1,865.45
800.16%
19.30%
18.07%
101.16%
3,752.61
4,472.20
25.88%
709.31
649.97
35.21%
545.03
656.73
49.56%
1,417.06
2,057.94

146,493.26
4476.63%
31,045.00
35,083.00
554.84%
11,595.00
27,910.00
764.58%
33,803.00
35,161.00
1270.05%
25,194.00
20,807.00
2,773.33%
26,126.00
11,414.00
648.00%
99.52%
97.86%
968.23%
25,295.00
32,789.00
172.77%
6,323.00
5,558.00
112.77%
3,298.00
4,433.00
123.66%
7,858.00
16,595.00

0.00
-72.81%
1,054.00
966.00
-89.65%
0.00
0.00
-100.00%
0.00
215.00
-83.41%
0.00
-47.00
-102.79%
0.00
0.00
-100.00%
5.08%
5.70%
-80.50%
1,399.00
1,504.00
-62.89%
0.00
0.00
-40.98%
0.00
0.00
-100.00%
0.00
0.00

AS% Chg.
SS - 5
SS -1
SS % Chg.
IS -5
IS -1
IS % Chg.
Other Core -5
Other Core -1
Other Core % Chg.
Instruction % Exp -5
Instruction % Exp -1

13.11%
4,125.30
4,487.63
8.78%
5,035.36
5,401.44
7.27%
684.64
852.46
24.51%
33.07%
32.80%

104.72%
2,036.32
2,003.58
35.65%
2,801.01
2,767.90
46.04%
2,317.17
2,704.84
3,162.66%
9.34%
9.76%

684.12%
16,206.00
10,951.00
185.71%
16,185.00
19,330.00
220.73%
19,285.00
23,038.00
15,712.50%
56.36%
63.77%

-87.14%
182.00
520.00
-76.50%
1,137.00
1,580.00
-74.10%
0.00
0.00
-100.00%
8.16%
3.24%
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Instruction % Exp -% Chg.
Total Revenues - 5
Total Expenses -5
Surplus/Deficit -5
FTE -5
Total Revenues - 1
Total Expenses -1
Surplus/Deficit -1
FTE -1
TR % Chg.
TE % Chg.
S/D % Chg.
FTE % Chg.
FRR -2013
FRR -2019
FRR % Chg.

-0.82%
27,169.72
23,831.70
3,338.02
2,076.91
27,312.69
25,369.28
1,943.41
1,985.12
0.53%
6.45%
-41.78%
-4.42%
2.19
2.24
-2.45%

20.42%
12,148.00
9,129.15
5,462.24
2,453.63
12,019.08
10,095.73
4,250.07
2,314.18
40.80%
38.57%
2,386.30%
36.73%
0.66
0.74
60.57%
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85.36%
71,741.00
58,303.00
26,825.00
14,940.00
77,599.00
70,324.00
20,664.00
15,926.00
264.31%
310.43%
1,312.54%
231.58%
3.00
3.00
100.00

-65.50%
4,741.00
4,524.00
-12,637.00
19.00
12,853.00
10,497.00
-12,791.00
41.00
-72.90%
-61.27%
-23,075.00%
-72.84%
-0.60
-0.10
N/A

Appendix H – Results of t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances – Research Question 1
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances – 13
Factor Model

Mean
Variance
Observations
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

HCM
0.426092177
0.017160344
54
0
136
5.469988694
1.04569E-07
1.656134988
2.09138E-07
1.977560777

Non-HCM
0.289476623
0.030599009
100

HCM
0.544035891
0.058078976
54
0
94
7.730924318
5.83387E-12
1.661225855
1.16677E-11
1.985523442

Non-HCM
0.246221936
0.040844066
100

FRR Only
0.544035891
0.058078976
54
0
82
3.159724724
0.001106095

13 Factor
0.426092177
0.017160344
54

t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances - FRR
Only

Mean
Variance
Observations
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances - HCM
Across Models

Mean
Variance
Observations
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
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t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

1.663649184
0.00221219
1.989318557

t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances - NonHCM Across Models
FRR Only
13 Factor
0.246221936 0.289476623
0.040844066 0.030599009
100
100
0
194
1.618277903
0.053613687
1.652745977
0.107227375
1.972267533

Mean
Variance
Observations
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail
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Appendix I – Results of t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances – Research Question 2
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances - FRR Only
Closed

Open

Mean

0.120564045

0.105599527

Variance

0.008453673

0.011865599

12

142

Observations
Hypothesized Mean Difference

0

df

14

t Stat

0.533077589

P(T<=t) one-tail

0.301170009

t Critical one-tail

1.761310136

P(T<=t) two-tail

0.602340018

t Critical two-tail

2.144786688

t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances - 13 Factor Model
Closed
Mean
Variance

Open

0.21504499

0.086149589

0.019673653

0.015249014

12

142

Observations
Hypothesized Mean Difference

0

df

12

t Stat

3.083958716

P(T<=t) one-tail

0.004734008

t Critical one-tail

1.782287556

P(T<=t) two-tail

0.009468016

t Critical two-tail

2.17881283

t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances - Cross Model
Closed
13 Factor
Mean
Variance
Observations
Hypothesized Mean Difference

FRR Only

0.21504499

0.120564045

0.019673653

0.008453673

12

12

0

df

19

t Stat

1.951509309

P(T<=t) one-tail

0.032948534

t Critical one-tail

1.729132812

P(T<=t) two-tail

0.065897067

t Critical two-tail

2.093024054

100
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